prEN ISO 13849-2
prEN ISO 13849-2
prEN ISO 13849-2: Safety of machinery - Safety-related parts of control systems - Part 2: Validation (ISO/DIS 13849-2:2026)

ISO/DIS 13849-2:2026(en)

ISO/TC 199/WG 8

Secretariat: DIN

Date: 2025-12-11

Safety of machinery — Safety-related parts of control systems — Part 2: Application of principles for the design and validation

© ISO 2026

All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, or required in the context of its implementation, no part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, or posting on the internet or an intranet, without prior written permission. Permission can be requested from either ISO at the address below or ISO’s member body in the country of the requester.

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Contents

Foreword iv

Introduction vi

1 Scope 1

2 Normative references 1

3 Terms and definitions 1

4 Design and validation 1

4.1 General 1

4.2 Integration of safety principles and fault exclusions 3

Annex A (informative) Validation tools for mechanical systems 6

Annex B (informative) Validation tools for pneumatic systems 12

Annex C (informative) Validation tools for hydraulic systems 28

Annex D (informative) Validation tools for electrical systems 41

D.1 General 41

D.2 Fault exclusion 49

D.2.1 General 49

D.2.2 “Tin whiskers” 49

D.2.3 Short circuits on PCB-mounted parts 49

D.2.4 Fault exclusions and integrated circuits 49

D.3 Soft errors 57

D.3.1 General 57

D.3.2 Introduction to soft errors 57

D.3.3 Relevance of soft errors for functional safety 57

D.3.4 Avoidance and control of soft errors during subsystem design 58

D.3.4.1 Analysis 58

D.3.4.2 Avoidance and reduction of soft errors 58

D.3.4.3 Control of soft errors 58

D.3.4.4 Determination of soft error rates to estimate PFH 59

D.3.4.5 Priority for the determination of soft error rates 59

D.3.4.6 Non-accessible hardware 59

D.3.5 Example demonstrating the contribution of soft errors to estimate PFH 60

Bibliography 62

Annex ZAA (informative) Relationship between this European Standard and the essential requirements of Directive 2006/42/EC aimed to be covered 65

Annex ZAB (informative) Relationship between this European Standard and the essential requirements of Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 aimed to be covered 67

Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work. ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of electrotechnical standardization.

The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular, the different approval criteria needed for the different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).

ISO draws attention to the possibility that the implementation of this document may involve the use of (a) patent(s). ISO takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of any claimed patent rights in respect thereof. As of the date of publication of this document, ISO had not received notice of (a) patent(s) which may be required to implement this document. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information, which may be obtained from the patent database available at www.iso.org/patents. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not constitute an endorsement.

For an explanation of the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), see www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html.

This document was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 199, Safety of machinery.

This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition (ISO 13849‑2:2012), which has been technically revised.

The main changes are as follows:

— alignment of Title and Scope;

— former Clause 4 to Clause 12 have been moved to ISO 13849‑1:2023;

— new Clause 4 introduces the application of basic and well-tried safety principles, well-tried components, faults and fault exclusions including guidance on typical approaches for fulfilling the principles in a new Table 2;

— new guidance in Table A.3, Table B.3, Table C.3 and Table D.3 for well-tried components;

— new Table D.22 on transmission errors;

— new Annex D.3 on soft errors;

— deletion of Annex E on an example of validation of fault behavior and diagnostic means.

A list of all parts in the ISO 13849 series can be found on the ISO website.

Any feedback or questions on this document should be directed to the user’s national standards body. A complete listing of these bodies can be found at www.iso.org/members.html.

Annex A, Annex B, Annex C and Annex D, which are informative, are structured according to Table 1.

Table 1 — Structure of Annex A to Annex D of ISO 13849‑2

Annex

Technology

List of basic safety principles

List of well-tried safety principles

List of well-tried components

Fault lists and fault exclusions

Table(s)

A

Mechanical

A.1

A.2

A.3

A.4, A.5

B

Pneumatic

B.1

B.2

B.3

B.4 to B.19

C

Hydraulic

C.1

C.2

C.3

C.4 to C.13

D

Electrical (includes electronics)

D.1

D.2

D.3

D.4 to D.22

Introduction

The structure of safety standards in the field of machinery is as follows:

1) type-A standards (basic safety standards) giving basic concepts, principles for design and general aspects that can be applied to machinery;

2) type-B standards (generic safety standards) dealing with one safety aspect or one type of safeguard that can be used across a wide range of machinery:

— type-B1 standards on particular safety aspects (for example safety distances, surface temperature, noise);

— type-B2 standards on safeguards (for example two-hand controls, interlocking devices, pressure-sensitive devices, guards);

3) type-C standards (machine safety standards) dealing with detailed safety requirements for a particular machine or group of machines.

This document is a type-B standard as stated in ISO 12100:2010.

The requirements of this document can be supplemented or modified by a type-C standard.

For machines which are covered by the scope of a type-C standard, and which have been designed and built according to the requirements of that standard, the requirements of that type-C standard take precedence.

This document provides requirements for the application of basic and well-tried safety principles and conditions for possible fault exclusions.

This document provides guidance for the design and the validation of mechanical, pneumatic, hydraulic, and electrical systems for the safety-related parts of a control system (SRP/CS) in accordance with ISO 13849-1:2023.

Most of the information in this document is based on the assumption that the simplified procedure for estimating the performance level (PL) described in ISO 13849‑1:2023, 6.1.8, is used.

Guidance on the general principles for the design (see ISO 12100:2010) of safety-related parts of control systems, regardless of the type of technology used (electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic, mechanical, etc.), is provided in ISO 13849‑1. This includes descriptions of some typical safety functions, determination of their required performance levels, and general requirements of categories and performance levels.

Within this document, some of the validation information is general, whereas some is specific to the type of technology used.

The responsible working group (ISO/TC 199/WG 8) developing the ISO 13849 series will develop application examples for ISO 13849-1 and ISO 13849-2 to be considered for publication in (a) separate document(s) in the ISO 13849 series to further support the user.

Safety of machinery — Safety-related parts of control systems — Part 2: Application of principles for the design and validation

1.0 1 Scope

This document provides requirements for the application of basic and well-tried safety principles, information on well-tried components and conditions for possible fault exclusions. This document provides guidance for the design and the validation of mechanical, pneumatic, hydraulic, and electrical systems for the safety-related parts of a control system (SRP/CS) in accordance with ISO 13849-1:2023.

NOTE Additional requirements for programmable electronic systems, including embedded software, are given in ISO 13849-1:2023, Clause 7, and IEC 61508 (all parts).

2.0 2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO 12100:2010, Safety of machinery — General principles for design — Risk assessment and risk reduction

ISO 13849‑1:2023, Safety of machinery — Safety-related parts of control systems — Part 1: General principles for design

3.0 3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO 12100 and ISO 13849‑1:2023 apply.

ISO and IEC maintain terminology databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:

— ISO Online browsing platform: available at https://www.iso.org/obp

— IEC Electropedia: available at https://www.electropedia.org/

4.0 4 Design and validation

4.1 4.1 General

This document supports the design and validation for SRP/CS as specified in ISO 13849‑1:2023 in providing additional information on

— basic and well-tried safety principles;

— well-tried components;

— faults and fault exclusions.

Concerning basic and well-tried safety principles, well-tried components and fault exclusions ISO 13849-1:2023 gives requirements on the design (especially in 6.1.3, 6.1.10 and 6.1.11) and validation (Clause 10) of SRP/CS and their subsystems. The focus in ISO 13849-1:2023 of is to generally link the requirements for safety principles to the categories (see ISO 13849-1:2023, Table 10) and to give general requirements and guidelines for well-tried components, faults to be considered and possible fault exclusions. Additionally general validation principles as well as requirements and guidelines how to validate SRP/CS and their subsystems are given.

This document supports the design and validation process by specific lists of applicable basic and well-tried safety principles, well-tried components and possible fault exclusions for several technologies.

The lists are based on experience and consensus in the international safety standardisation community and are as detailed as possible on the level of general machinery. For a specific application these lists can be interpreted and adapted based on technical justification to fulfil the general requirements in ISO 13849-1:2023.

The lists form a comprehensive approach that is applicable throughout different individual applications and are non-exhaustive. Any deviations from the lists in this document shall be justified and documented, see 4.2.

For further information, see Table A.1, Table A.2, Table A.3, Table B.1, Table B.2, Table B.3, Table C.1, Table C.2, Table C.3, Table D.1, Table D.2 and Table D.3 in the Annexes.

Table 2 provides guidance on typical approaches for fulfilling the basic and well-tried safety principles.

Table 2 — Typical approaches for fulfilling basic and well-tried safety principles

Design and manufacturing of components [M]

Design of subsystems [D]

Use of the machine [U]

 

— Fulfill the relevant safety principles for the design and manufacturing of components (e.g., safe position, use of well-tried spring, sufficient positive overlapping in spool valves).

— Specify the operating conditions and limits of use for the design and use, e.g., in data sheets and installation and operation instructions.

 

— Fulfill the relevant safety principles for the integration of components into subsystems (e.g., de-energization principle, pressure limitation).

— Adhere to the operating conditions and limits of use of components defined in the installation and operation instructions.

— Specify the operating conditions and limits of use of the subsystems in the machine including the resulting conditions from the integrated components (e.g., proper temperature range, sufficient avoidance of contamination of the fluid).

 

— Adhere to the operating conditions and limits of use of subsystems in the machine, included in the information for use and installation and operation instructions of the machine (e.g., proper temperature range, sufficient avoidance of contamination of the fluid, maintenance plan).

NOTE 1   Several safety principles are relevant from component level up to the use of the machine, e.g., use of suitable materials and adequate manufacturing, correct dimensioning and shaping, proper selection, combination, arrangements, assembly, and installation of components/system. These principles typically are relevant for the design and manufacturing of components (e.g., correct dimensioning of housing), the design and integration of components into subsystems (e.g., correct dimensioning of component parameters with respect to the expected load) and the installation and use of components and subsystems (e.g., correct dimensioning of filters and maintenance intervals).

NOTE 2   For the design and manufacturing of components fulfilment of product standards can be helpful for the confirmation of some basic or well-tried safety principles. In most cases the fulfilment of product standards is necessary to fulfil the basic safety principle proper selection, combination, arrangement, assembly, and installation of components/system.

NOTE 3   The specification of operating conditions and limits of use, e.g., in data sheets and installation and operation instructions, usually show that the safety principles for the construction and design of a component for the specified application are applied. Further information on safety related values of components or parts of control systems can be found in ISO 13849-1:2023, Annex O.

To support design and validation see

— Annex A for mechanical systems;

— Annex B for pneumatic systems;

— Annex C for hydraulic systems;

— Annex D for electrical systems.

4.1.1 4.2 Integration of safety principles and fault exclusions

Applicable basic safety principles shall be applied for all categories.

Applicable well-tried safety principles shall be applied for category 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Any decision that a safety principle is not applicable for technical reasons or based on the risk assessment shall be justified and documented in detail. This is related to the specific application and the industrial sector in which the SRP/CS is intended to be used.

Relevant fault exclusions may be applied (see Tables A.4, A.5, B.4 – B.19, C4 – C.13, and Clause D.2). These fault exclusions shall be justified and documented (see ISO 13849-1:2023, 6.1.10.3).

An analysis based on the following criteria shall be done to demonstrate which safety principles are required in the specific application:

— Only the safety principles for the relevant technologies and type of design are required.

Example 1: For a pneumatic valve with electronic pilot control,

— Table A.1 and Table A.2 are relevant for the mechanical part;

— Table B.1 and Table B.2 are relevant for the pneumatic part; and

— Table D.1 and Table D.2 are relevant for the electronic part.

Example 2: For an electromechanical limit switch, Table A.1 and Table A.2 are relevant for the mechanical part and Table D.1 and Table D.2 are relevant for the electrical part.

Example 3: The well-tried safety principle “sufficient positive overlap in spool valves” applies to spool or gate valves but not to seat or cartridge valves.

Example 4: The well-tried safety principle “valve closed by load pressure” applies to seat or cartridge valves but not to spool or gate valves.

— Safety principles which are not applicable for technical reasons may be substituted by other safety principles or alternative measures which have the same effect. A well-tried safety principle shall not be replaced by a basic safety principle.

Example 5: When the application of the basic safety principle “Sequential switching for circuit of serial contacts of redundant signals” is not possible for technical reasons, then the well-tried safety principle “limitation of electrical parameters” (realized by overload protection of the contacts, e.g. by using a fuse) may be used as a substitute to avoid welding of both contacts.

The application of safety principles for subsystem elements can be validated in any of the following ways:

— The information for use (e.g. data sheet or application notes) of the subsystem element contains the confirmation that all applicable safety principles relevant for the design and manufacturing of the subsystem element are applied.

— The features specified in the information for use (e.g. data sheet or application notes) for the subsystem element indirectly confirm the application of some safety principles for the subsystem element.

NOTE 1: Normally there is no need to check the validity of these assured features during the integration of the subsystem element.

Example 6: The well-tried safety principle “over-dimensioning/safety factor” can be fulfilled by underrating the maximum load for an electrical output in relation to the specified maximum load. Over-dimensioning of environmental characteristics, e.g. temperature, is usually not required if the subsystem element is not constantly operated on the edge of the environmental characteristics.

When previously validated subsystems are integrated into SRP/CS there is no need to validate again the fulfilment of the internally applied safety principles. Only safety principles which affect the external integration shall be applied and validated.

Example 7: The parametrization of inputs of a previously validated safety PLC is validated during the integration.

NOTE 2: A component complying with a type-B2 standard, e.g. ISO 14119:2024, Safety of machinery - Interlocking devices associated with guards - Principles for design and selection, usually supports the basic safety principles “use of suitable materials and adequate manufacturing” and “correct dimensioning and shaping”. But for the integration of this component into an SRP/CS several other applicable safety principles are additionally necessary, e.g. “use of de-energization”, “compatibility”, “withstanding environmental conditions” or “secure fixing of input devices”.

NOTE 3: Wording such as “robust”, “simple”, “significant”, “sufficient” and similar terms is intended to emphasize requirements or recommendations and is not quantified by factors or discrete values. Such information is found in product specific standards, e.g. type-C standards, and is not presented in this document. The term “good engineering practice” denotes a method to achieve a reliable SRP/CS through the systematic application of proven techniques, documented procedures, qualified personnel, risk assessment and mitigation, and thorough verification and validation activities.

Figure 1 shows the process for integrating the basic and well-tried safety principles as well as the fault exclusions.

NOTE Well-tried safety principles are not mandatory for category B, see ISO 13849-1:2023, Table 10.

Figure 1 — Integration of basic safety principles, well tried safety principles and fault exclusions

Annex A
(informative)

Validation tools for mechanical systems

Annex A applies to mechanical systems. It should also be considered when mechanical systems are used in conjunction with other technologies.

Table A.1 and Table A.2 list basic and well-tried safety principles.

The use of components designed according to a product standard can be helpful for the confirmation of some basic or well-tried safety principles (see Table 2, NOTE 2).

The fulfilment of principles can depend on multiple contributors involved in SRP/CS design (see 4.1, Table 2, implemented in column 3 of Table A.1 and Table A.2).

The status of “well-tried” is mainly application specific. Components can be described as “well-tried” if they are in accordance with ISO 13849-1:2023, 6.1.11. A well-tried component for some applications could be inappropriate for other applications. The status of being well-tried does not mean that all faults can be excluded for a well-tried component.

Table A.4 and Table A.5 list fault exclusions and their rationale.

Table A.1 — Basic safety principles

Basic safety principle

Remarks

Relevant for

(see Table 2)

Use of suitable materials and adequate manufacturing

Selection of material, manufacturing methods and treatment in relation to, e.g. stress, durability, elasticity, friction, wear, corrosion, temperature.

M, D

Correct dimensioning and shaping

Consider, e.g. stress, strain, fatigue, surface roughness, tolerances, sticking, manufacturing.

M, D

Correct selection, combination, arrangements, assembly and installation of components or systems related to the application

Apply the installation and operation instructions provided by the manufacturer, e.g. catalogue sheets, installation instructions, specifications, and use of good engineering practice in similar components or systems.

M, D, U

Use of de-energization principle

This principle is not applicable when loss of energy creates a hazard, e.g. release of workpiece caused by loss of clamping or holding force.

The safe state is obtained by a release of energy. See primary action for stopping in ISO 12100:2010, 6.2.11.3.

Energy is supplied for starting the movement of a mechanism. See primary action for starting in ISO 12100:2010, 6.2.11.3.

Consider different modes, e.g. operation mode, maintenance mode.

Time-delay functions may be necessary to achieve a system safe state (see e.g. IEC 60204-1:2016 + AMD1:2021, 9.2.2).

M, D

Correct fastening

For screw locking apply the manufacturer's installation and operation instructions.

Fastening in the correct orientation and fastening to the correct torque is considered. Overloading can be avoided and adequate resistance to release can be achieved by applying adequate torque loading technology.

M, D, U

Withstanding environmental conditions

(see ISO 13849-1:2023, Clause 10, and follow manufacturer's installation and operation instructions)

Design the equipment so that it can work within the environmental limits of the intended use and in any reasonably foreseeable adverse conditions, e.g. temperature, humidity, vibration, pollution.

M, D, U

Prevention of the ingress of solid foreign objects and fluids

Apply appropriate protection against ingress of solid foreign objects and fluids.

M, D, U

Temperature range

External and internal temperature effects are considered throughout the whole system.

M, D, U

Limitation of speed, acceleration and jerk (to avoid or limit mechanical stress)

Consider, e.g. spring, damping device.

M, D

Reduction of response time

Minimize delay in de-energizing of switching components.

Consider, e.g. spring fatigue, friction, lubrication, temperature, inertia during acceleration and deceleration, combination of tolerances.

M, D

Protection against unexpected start-up

(see ISO 12100:2010, 6.2.11.4, ISO 14118:2017)

Consider unexpected start-up caused by stored energy and after power supply restoration for different modes e.g. operation mode, maintenance mode.

M, D

Special equipment for release of stored energy can be necessary.

Special applications, e.g. to keep energy for clamping devices or ensure a position, need to be considered separately.

M, D, U

Simplification

Avoid unnecessary components in the safety-related system.

M, D

Separation

Separation of safety-related functions from other functions.

M, D

Limitation of the generation and/or transmission of force, torque (e.g. to prevent wear)

This principle is not applicable when the continued integrity of components is essential to maintain the necessary level of control.

Examples are break pin, break plate and torque-limiting clutch.

M, D

Lubrication

Consider the need for lubrication devices, information on lubricants and lubrication intervals.

M, D, U

Abbreviations

M – Design and manufacturing of components

D – Design of subsystems

U – Use of the machine

Table A.2 — Well-tried safety principles

Well-tried safety principle

Remarks

Relevant for

(see Table 2)

Use of carefully selected materials and manufacturing

Selection of suitable material, adequate manufacturing methods and treatments related to the application.

M, D

Use of components with oriented failure mode

(see ISO 12100:2010, 6.2.12.3)

Use oriented failure mode components or systems wherever practicable. A safe state is directly or indirectly (e.g. through fault detection) obtained by the predominant failure mode.

M, D

Over-dimensioning

De-rate components when used in safety circuits.

Safety factors are as given in standards or by good engineering practice in safety-related applications.

M, D

Safe position

The moving part of the component is held in one of the possible positions by mechanical means. Force is needed to change the position, especially to leave a safe position.

If the realization is based on the principle of frictional engagement, the frictional force is always greater than the disturbing forces for the entire mission time.

M, D

Increased OFF force

A safe position or state is obtained by an increased OFF force in relation to the ON force.

M, D

Careful selection of fastening related to the application

Avoid relying only on friction, use e.g. form-fitting connections like positive-locking fastening, material-related connections like glueing/welding/soldering/vulcanizing, locking nuts.

M, D

Positive mechanical action

(see ISO 12100:2010, 6.2.5.)

To achieve positive (or direct) mechanical action, mechanical components needed for the safety function are moved either by direct contact or via rigid elements, e.g. a cam directly opens the contacts of an electrical switch rather than relying on a spring.

M, D

Multiple parts

Reducing the effect of faults by providing multiple parts acting in parallel, e.g. where a failure of one of several springs does not lead to a dangerous condition.

M, D

Use of well-tried spring

See Table A.3

M, D

Limited range of force and similar parameters

This principle is not applicable when the continued integrity of components is essential to maintaining the necessary level of control.

Determination of the necessary limitation in relation to the experience and application. Examples are break pin, break plate, and torque-limiting clutch.

M, D

Limited range of speed and similar parameters

Determination of the necessary limitation in relation to the experience and application. Examples are centrifugal governor, safe monitoring of speed, and limited displacement.

M, D, U

Limited range of environmental parameters

See ISO 13849-1:2023, 10.7

Determination of the necessary limitations. Examples are temperature, humidity, pollution at the installation. Follow manufacturer's installation and operation instructions.

M, D, U

Limited range of reaction time, limited hysteresis

Determination of the necessary limitations.

For example, spring fatigue, friction, lubrication, temperature, inertia during acceleration and deceleration, combination of tolerances.

M, D

Abbreviations

M – Design and manufacturing of components

D – Design of subsystems

U – Use of the machine

Table A.3 — Well-tried components

Well-tried component

Conditions for “well-tried”

Standard or specification

Screw

All factors influencing the screw connection and the application are to be considered. See Table A.2.

Mechanical jointing such as screws, nuts, washers, rivets, pins, bolts, etc. is standardized.

Spring

Well-tried springs are characterized by

Technical specifications for spring steels and other special applications are given in EN 13906‑1:2013.

 

— use of carefully selected materials, manufacturing methods (e.g. pre-setting and cycling before use) and treatments (e.g. rolling and shot-peening);

— sufficient guidance of the spring; and

— sufficient safety factor for fatigue stress (i.e. with a high probability that a fracture will not occur, which can be demonstrated by an endurance test of e.g. a valve with the built-in spring or using other ways).

 

Well-tried compression coil springs can also be designed by

 

 

 

— use of carefully selected materials, manufacturing methods (e.g. pre-setting and cycling before use) and treatments (e.g. rolling and shot-peening);

— sufficient guidance of the spring;

— clearance between the turns less than the wire diameter when unloaded; and

— sufficient force after a fracture(s) is maintained (i.e. a fracture(s) will not lead to a dangerous condition).

 

 

NOTE   Compression springs are preferred.

 

Cam

All factors influencing the cam arrangement (e.g. part of an interlocking device) are to be considered. See Table A.2.

See ISO 14119:2024

Break-pin Rupture disc, Shear pin

All factors influencing the application are to be considered. See Table A.2.

See ISO 4126-2:2018

Plunger

Guiding of the plunger in such a way that clamping/sticking can be excluded. The plunger is dimensioned in such a way that the forces can be transmitted reliably.

 

Table A.4 — Faults and fault exclusions — Mechanical devices, components and elements (e.g. cam, follower, chain, clutch, brake, shaft, screw, pin, guide, bearing)

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Wear/corrosion

Yes, in the case of carefully selected material, (over)dimensioning, manufacturing process, treatment and proper lubrication, according to the specified lifetime (see also Table A.2).

See ISO 13849‑1:2023, 6.1.10

Untightening/ loosening

Yes, in the case of carefully selected material, manufacturing process, locking means and treatment, according to the specified lifetime (see also Table A.2).

Fracture

Yes, in the case of carefully selected material, (over)dimensioning, manufacturing process, treatment and proper lubrication, according to the specified lifetime (see also Table A.2).

Deformation by overstressing

Yes, in the case of carefully selected material, (over)dimensioning, treatment and manufacturing process, according to specified lifetime (see also Table A.2).

Stiffness/sticking

Yes, in the case of carefully selected material, (over)dimensioning, manufacturing process, treatment and proper lubrication, according to specified lifetime (see also Table A.2).

Table A.5 — Faults and fault exclusions — Pressure-coil springs

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Wear/corrosion

Yes, in case of use of well-tried springs and carefully selected fastenings (see Table A.3).

See ISO 13849‑1:2023, 6.1.10

Force reduction by setting and fracture

Fracture

Stiffness/sticking

Loosening

Deformation by overstressing

Annex B
(informative)

Validation tools for pneumatic systems

Annex B applies to pneumatic systems. It should also be considered when pneumatic systems are used in conjunction with other technologies. Where pneumatic components are electrically connected/controlled, the appropriate fault lists in Annex D should be considered.

NOTE Additional requirements can exist in national legislation.

Table B.1 and Table B.2 list basic and well-tried safety principles.

The use of components designed according to a product standard can be helpful for the confirmation of some basic or well-tried safety principles (see Table 2, Note 2).

The fulfilment of principles can depend on multiple contributors (see 4.1, Table 2, implemented in column 3 of Table B.1 and Table B.2).

The status of “well-tried” is mainly application‑specific. Components can be described as “well-tried” if they are in accordance with ISO 13849‑1:2023, 6.1.11 and ISO 4414:2010, Clause 5 to Clause 7. A well-tried component for some applications could be inappropriate for other applications. The status of being well-tried does not mean that all faults can be excluded for a well-tried component

Table B.4 to Table B.19 list fault exclusions and their rationale.

Table B.1 — Basic safety principles

Basic safety principle

Remarks

Relevant for

(see Table 2)

Use of suitable materials and adequate manufacturing

Selection of material, manufacturing methods and treatment in relation to, e.g. stress, durability, elasticity, friction, wear, corrosion, temperature characteristics of compressed air.

M, D

Correct dimensioning and shaping

Consider, e.g. stress, strain, fatigue, surface roughness, tolerances, sticking, manufacturing.

M, D

Correct selection, combination, arrangements, assembly and installation of components or systems related to the application

Apply the installation and operation instructions provided by the manufacturer, e.g. catalogue sheets, installation instructions, specifications, and use of good engineering practice in similar components or systems.

M, D, U

Use of de-energization principle

This principle is not applicable when loss of energy creates a hazard, e.g. release of workpiece caused by loss of clamping or holding force.

The safe state is obtained by release of energy to all relevant devices. See primary action for stopping in ISO 12100:2010, 6.2.11.3.

Energy is supplied for starting the movement of a mechanism. See primary action for starting in ISO 12100:2010, 6.2.11.3.

Consider different modes, e.g. operation mode, maintenance mode.

Time-delay functions may be necessary to achieve a system safe state (see e.g. IEC 60204-1:2016 + AMD1:2021, 9.2.2).

M, D

Correct fastening

For fasteners (e.g. screw locking, fittings, gluing or clamp ring) apply the manufacturer's installation and operation instructions.

Fastening in the correct orientation and fastening to the correct torque is considered. Overloading can be avoided by applying adequate torque loading technology.

M, D, U

Withstanding environmental conditions

(see ISO 13849-1:2023, Clause 10, and follow manufacturer's installation and operation instructions)

Design the equipment so that it can work within the environmental limits of the intended use and in any reasonably foreseeable adverse conditions, e.g. temperature, humidity, vibration, pollution, electromagnetic interference (EMI).

M, D, U

Prevention of the ingress of solid foreign objects and fluids

Apply appropriate protection against ingress of solid foreign objects and fluids.

M, D, U

Temperature range

External and internal temperature effects are considered throughout the whole system.

(see ISO 4414:2010)

M, D, U

Limitation of speed, acceleration and jerk (to avoid or limit mechanical stress)

An example is the speed limitation placed on a piston by a flow valve or throttle.

M, D

Reduction of response time

Minimize delay in de-energizing of switching components.

Suitable range of switching time, e.g. length of pipework, pressure, exhaust capacity, force, spring fatigue, friction, lubrication, temperature, inertia during acceleration and deceleration, frequencies, shock waves, combination of tolerances.

M, D

Simplification

Avoid unnecessary components in the safety-related system.

M, D

Protection against unexpected start-up

(see ISO 12100:2010, 6.2.11.4, ISO 14118:2017)

Consider unexpected start-up caused by stored energy and after power supply restoration for different modes, e.g. operation mode, maintenance mode.

M, D

Special equipment for the release of stored energy can be necessary.

Special applications, e.g. to maintain energy for clamping devices or ensure a position, need to be considered separately.

M, D, U

Separation

Separation of the safety-related functions from other functions.

M, D

Pressure limitation (e.g. to prevent wear)

Examples are pressure-relief valve, pressure-reducing/control valve.

M, D

Basic measures against contamination of the fluid

Consider filtration and separation of solid particles and water in the fluid. Prevent contamination of fluid by external sources during installation and handling of components.

Consider an indicator for when the filter needs service.

M, D, U

Correct use of pre-lubricated/self- lubricating/life-time lubrication valves

Use prepared oil-free air according to the manufacturer's installation and operation instructions, to prevent dissipation of the grease.

D, U

Abbreviations

M – Design and manufacturing of components

D – Design of subsystems

U – Use of the machine

Table B.2 — Well-tried safety principles

Well-tried safety principle

Remarks

Relevant for

(see Table 2)

Use of components with oriented failure mode

(see ISO 12100:2010, 6.2.12.3)

Use oriented failure mode components or systems wherever practicable. A safe state is directly or indirectly (e.g. through fault detection) obtained by the predominant failure mode.

M, D

Over-dimensioning

De-rate components when used in safety circuits, e.g. with respect to pressure level, temperature level, switching frequency.

Safety factors are as given in standards or by good engineering practice in safety-related applications.

M, D

Safe position

The moving part of the component is held in one of the possible positions by mechanical means. Force is needed to change the position.

If the realization is based on the principle of frictional engagement, the frictional force is always greater than the disturbing forces for the entire mission time.

M, D

Increased OFF force

A safe position or safe state is obtained by an increased OFF force in relation to the ON force.

One solution can be that the area ratio for moving a valve spool to the safe position (OFF position) is significantly larger than for moving the spool to ON position.

M, D

Valve closed by load pressure

These are generally, but not exclusively, seat valves, e.g. poppet valves, ball valves.

Consider how to apply the load pressure to keep the valve closed even if, e.g. the spring closing the valve breaks.

NOTE   High closing speeds can cause valve bounce.

M, D

Positive mechanical action

(see ISO 12100:2010, 6.2.5.)

The positive mechanical action is used for moving parts inside pneumatic components.

To achieve positive (or direct) mechanical action, mechanical components needed for the safety function are moved either by direct contact or via rigid elements.

M, D

Use of well-tried spring

See Table A.3.

M

Limited range of force and similar parameters to avoid or limit mechanical stress

This principle is not applicable when the continued integrity of components is essential to maintaining the necessary level of control.

Determination of the necessary limitation in relation to the experience and application.

This can be achieved by a well-tried pressure relief valve which is, e.g. equipped with a well-tried spring, correctly dimensioned and selected.

M, D

Limited range of speed and similar parameters

Determination of the necessary limitation in relation to the experience and application.

Examples are fixed orifices and fixed throttles to reduce the speed by resistance to a defined fluidic flow.

M, D, U

Limited range of environmental parameters

See ISO 13849-1:2023, 10.7

Determination of the necessary limitations. Examples are temperature, humidity, pollution at the installation. Follow manufacturer's installation and operation instructions.

M, D, U

Limited range of reaction time, limited hysteresis

Determination of the necessary limitations.

For example, increased friction will increase the hysteresis. A combination of tolerances will also influence the hysteresis.

M, D

Appropriate range of working conditions

The limitation of working conditions, e.g. pressure range, flow rate and temperature range, is considered.

M, D, U

Enhanced measures against contamination of the fluid

Consideration of the need for a finer filtration and separation of solid particles and water in the fluid.

M, D, U

Sufficient positive overlap in spool valves or piston valves

The positive overlap ensures the stopping function and prevents dangerous movements.

M

Sufficient underlap in spool valves

Exhaust applications in redundant systems.

M

Periodic evaluation of the fluid condition

Apply a high degree of filtration or separation of solid particles, water and contaminants in the fluid and an indication of the need for a filter service.

Evaluate the physical conditions of the fluid.

M, D, U

Abbreviations

M – Design and manufacturing of components

D – Design of subsystems

U – Use of the machine

Table B.3 — Well-tried components

Well-tried component

Conditions for “well-tried”

Standard or specification

Rupture disc

All factors influencing the application are to be considered. See Table B.1 and Table B.2

Technical specifications for bursting disk/flat bursting disk and other special applications are given in ISO 4126-2:2018.

Directional Valve

(electrically or remotely actuated or piloted)

Only well-tried if

ISO 13849‑1:2023, 6.1.3.2.3, 6.1.11

a) the component fulfils the basic and well-tried safety principles with regard to the intended application, including use of the component according to the specification of the manufacturer;

b) proven to be widely used in the past with documented successful results in similar applications or made, verified and validated using principles which demonstrate its suitability and reliability for safety-related applications according to relevant product and application standards;

c) either no electronics on-board or on-board electronics, if available, does not participate in executing the safety function (see NOTE 3);

d) the behavior of the component under all conditions is well defined and can be completely determined; and

e) the following construction characteristics are fulfilled:

— simple, robust design;

— positive connection;

— sufficient protection against loosening with detachable connection;

— sufficiently robust in relation to the use (application) and the ambient conditions (e.g. pressure fluctuations, vibration);

— return force provided by a spring to a safe position;

— use of well-tried springs (see Table A.3); and

— sufficient tightness in locking direction.

Pressure switches

Only well-tried if

ISO 13849‑1:2023, 6.1.3.2.3, 6.1.11

For the electrical part, see IEC 60947­5­1:2024

a) the component fulfils the basic and well-tried safety principles with regard to the intended application, including use of the component according to the specification of the manufacturer;

b) proven to be widely used in the past with documented successful results in similar applications or made, verified and validated using principles which demonstrate its suitability and reliability for safety-related applications according to relevant product and application standards;

c) either no electronics on-board or on-board electronics, if available, does not participate in executing the safety function;

d) the behavior of the component under all conditions is well defined and can be completely determined; and

e) the following construction characteristics are fulfilled:

— simple, robust design;

— positive connection;

— sufficient protection against loosening with detachable connection;

— sufficiently robust in relation to the use (application) and the ambient conditions (e.g. pressure fluctuations, vibration); and

— sufficient dimensioning of the spring.

NOTE 1   The confirmation of basic and well-tried safety principles, as well as proof of wide use in the past with documented successful results in similar applications, can be done by the component manufacturer or by the designer of the subsystem.

NOTE 2   Examples of directional valves can be valve types with discrete (specific) positions: stop (shut-off) valve, gate valve, AND-valve, shuttle valve, non-return (check) valve, blocking valve, exhaust valve, pressure relief valve.

NOTE 3   Digital communication units for valve manifolds or pressure switches are complex and do not fulfil the conditions to be well-tried. If shutting-off the power supply puts the valves into a safe state and if a fault exclusion for cross-circuit connections between the power supply and the control bus (see Annex D) can be made and if for the installed valves the conditions for “well-tried” are fulfilled, the manifold can be considered a well-tried component.

Table B.4 — Faults and fault exclusions — Directional control valves

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Change of switching times

Yes, in the case of positive mechanical action (see Table A.2) of the moving components, as long as the actuating force is sufficiently large.

Non-switching (sticking at the end or zero position) or incomplete switching (sticking at a random intermediate position)

Yes, in the case of positive mechanical action (see Table A.2) of the moving components, as long as the actuating force is sufficiently large.

Spontaneous change of the initial switching position (without an input signal)

Yes, in the case of positive mechanical action (see Table A.2) of the moving components, as long as the holding force is sufficiently large, or if well-tried springs are used (see Table A.3) and normal installation and operating conditions apply (see remark), or in the case of spool valves with elastic sealing and if normal installation and operating conditions apply (see remark).

Normal installation and operating conditions apply when

 

— the conditions laid down by the manufacturer have been considered;

— there are no inertia forces acting adversely on moving components (e.g. direction of valve component motion considers magnitude and direction of inertia forces); and

— the vibration and shock stresses are smaller than permissible, and no extreme vibration and shock stresses occur.

Leakage

Yes, in the case of spool-type valves with elastic seal, in so far as a sufficient positive overlap is present [see remark 1)], normal conditions of operation apply, and an adequate treatment and filtration of the compressed air is provided; or, in the case of seat valves, if normal conditions of operation apply [see remark 2)], and adequate treatment and filtration of the compressed air is provided.

1)   In the case of spool-type valves with elastic seal, the effects due to leakage can usually be excluded. However, a small amount of leakage can occur over a long period of time.

2)   Normal conditions of operation apply when the conditions laid down by the manufacturer are considered.

Change in the leakage flow rate over a long period of use

None.

Bursting of the valve housing or breakage of the moving component(s) as well as breakage/fracture of the mounting or housing screws

Yes, if construction, dimensioning and installation are in accordance with good engineering practice.

For servo and proportional valves: pneumatic faults which cause uncontrolled behavior

Yes, in the case of servo and proportional directional valves, if these can be assessed in terms of technical safety as conventional directional control valves, owing to their design and construction.

NOTE If the control functions are realized by a number of single-function valves, then a fault analysis should be carried out for each valve. The same procedure should be carried out in the case of piloted valves.

Table B.5 — Faults and fault exclusions — Stop (shut-off) valves/non-return (check) valves/quick‑action venting valves/shuttle valves, etc.

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Change of switching times

None.

Non-opening, incomplete opening, non-closure or incomplete closure (sticking at an end position or at an arbitrary intermediate position)

Yes, if the guidance system for the moving component(s) is designed in a manner similar to that for a non-controlled ball seat valve without a damping system (see remark) and if well-tried springs are used (see Table A.3).

For a non-controlled ball seat valve without a damping system, the guidance system is generally designed such that any sticking of the moving component is unlikely.

Spontaneous change of the initial switching position (without an input signal)

Yes, for normal installation and operating conditions (see remark) and if there is sufficient closing force on the basis of the pressures and areas provided.

Normal installation and operating conditions are met when

 

— the conditions laid down by the manufacturer are being followed;

— no special inertial forces affect the moving components, e.g. direction of motion considers the orientation of the moving machine parts; and

— the vibration and shock stresses are smaller than permissible, and no extreme vibration or shock stresses occur.

For shuttle valves: simultaneous closing of both input connections

Yes, if simultaneous closing is unlikely, based on the construction and design of the moving component.

Leakage

Yes, if normal conditions of operation apply (see remark) and there is adequate treatment and filtration of the compressed air.

Normal conditions of operation apply when the conditions laid down by the manufacturer are considered.

Change in the leakage flow rate over a long period of use

None.

Bursting of the valve housing or breakage of the moving component(s) as well as breakage/fracture of the mounting or housing screws

Yes, if construction, dimensioning and installation are in accordance with good engineering practice and following the valve manufacturer’s specifications.

Table B.6 — Faults and fault exclusions — Flow valves

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Change in flow rate without any change in setting device

Yes, for flow control valves containing components of metal without moving parts [see remark 1)], e.g. throttle valves, if normal operating conditions apply [see remark 2)], and adequate treatment and filtration of the compressed air is provided.

1)   The setting device is not considered to be a moving part. Changes in flow rate due to changes in pressure differences are physically limited in this type of valve and are not covered by this assumed fault.

2)   Normal operating conditions apply when the conditions laid down by the manufacturer are considered.

Change in the flow rate in the case of non-adjustable, circular orifices and nozzles

Yes, if the diameter is ≥ 0,8 mm, normal operating conditions apply [see remark 2)], and if adequate treatment and filtration of the compressed air is provided.

For proportional flow valves: change in the flow rate due to an unintended change in the set value

None.

Spontaneous change in the setting device

Yes, where there is an effective protection of the setting device adapted to the particular case, based upon technical safety specification(s).

Unintended loosening (unscrewing) of the operating element(s) of the setting device

Yes, if an effective positive locking device against loosening (unscrewing) is provided.

Bursting of the valve housing or breakage of the moving component(s) as well as the breakage/fracture of the mounting or housing screws

Yes, if construction, dimensioning and installation are in accordance with good engineering practice and following the valve manufacturer’s specifications.

Table B.7 — Faults and fault exclusions — Pressure valves

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Non-opening or insufficient opening when exceeding the set pressure (sticking or sluggish movement of the moving component) [see remark 1)]

Yes, if

1)   This fault applies only when the pressure valve(s) is used for forced actions, e.g. clamping.

This fault does not apply to its normal function in the pneumatic systems, e.g. pressure limitation, pressure decrease.

2)   For a non-controlled ball seat valve or for a membrane valve, the guidance system is generally designed such that any sticking of the moving component is unlikely.

Non-closing or insufficient closing if pressure drops below the set value (sticking or sluggish movement of the moving component) [see remark 1)]

 

— the guidance system for the moving component(s) is similar to the case of a non-controlled ball seat or membrane valve [see remark 2)], e.g. for a pressure-reducing valve with secondary pressure relief; and

— the installed springs are well-tried springs (see Table A.3).

Change of the pressure control behavior without changing the setting device [see remark 1)]

Yes, for directly actuated pressure-limiting valves and pressure-switching valves if the installed spring(s) are well-tried (see Table A.3).

 

For proportional pressure valves: change in the pressure control behavior due to unintended change in the set value [see remark 1)]

None.

 

Spontaneous change in the setting device

Yes, where there is effective protection of the setting device within the requirements of the application, e.g. lead seals.

Unintended unscrewing of the operating element of the setting device

Yes, if an effective positive locking device against unscrewing is provided.

 

Leakage

Yes, for seat valves, membrane valves and spool valves with elastic sealing in normal operating conditions (see remark) and if adequate treatment and filtration of the compressed air is provided.

Normal operating conditions are met when the conditions laid down by the manufacturer are followed.

Change of the leakage flow rate, over a long period of use

None.

Bursting of the valve housing or breakage of the moving component(s) as well as breakage/fracture of the mounting or housing screws

Yes, if construction, dimensioning and installation are in accordance with good engineering practice and following the valve manufacturer’s specifications.

 

Table B.8 — Faults and fault exclusions — Piping

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Bursting and leakage

Yes, if the dimensioning, choice of materials and fixing are in accordance with good engineering practice (see remark) e.g. installation avoiding accumulation of water, regular draining.

When using plastic pipes, it is necessary to consider the manufacturer's data, in particular with respect to operational environmental influences, e.g. thermal influences, chemical influences or influences due to radiation. When using steel pipes that have not been treated with a corrosion-resistant medium, it is particularly important to provide sufficient drying of the compressed air. Consideration of the environmental dew point is also essential.

Failure at the connector (e.g. tearing off, leakage)

Yes, if using bite-type fittings or threaded pipes (i.e. steel fittings, steel pipes) and if dimensioning, choice of materials, manufacture, configuration and fixing are in accordance with good engineering practice.

Clogging (blockage)

Yes, for pipework in the power circuit.

Yes, for the control and measurement pipework if the nominal diameter is ≥ 2 mm.

Kinking of plastic pipes with a small nominal diameter

Yes, if properly protected and installed, considering the relevant manufacturer's data, e.g. minimum bending radius.

Table B.9 — Faults and fault exclusions — Hose assemblies

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Bursting, tearing off at the fitting attachment and leakage

Yes, if hose assemblies use hoses manufactured in accordance with ISO 4079:2020, ISO 2398:2024, ISO 5774:2023 or similar hoses (see remark) with the corresponding hose fittings.

NOTE: ISO 4414:2010 does not include criteria regarding the manufacturing specifications of rubber hoses and hose assemblies.

Fault exclusion is not considered when

 

— the intended lifetime is expired;

— fatigue behavior of reinforcement can occur; or

— external damage is unavoidable.

Clogging (blockage)

Yes, for hose assemblies in the power circuit, and, in the case of the control and measurement hose assemblies, if the nominal diameter is ≥ 2 mm.

Table B.10 — Faults and fault exclusions — Connectors

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Bursting, breaking of screws or stripping of threads

Yes, if dimensioning, choice of material, manufacture, configuration and connection to the piping and/or to the pipe/hose fittings are in accordance with good engineering practice.

Leakage (loss of airtightness)

None.

Due to wear, ageing, deterioration of elasticity, etc. it is not possible to exclude faults over a long period.

Leakage (sudden major change of airtightness)

Yes, if measures to reduce the risk of leakage are applied that could lead to the loss of the intended component function.

Measures can include but are not limited to:

1)   If leakage (sudden major change of airtightness) can lead to a dangerous movement, particularly on gravity-loaded (e.g. vertical) axes, a fault exclusion is not recommended. A fault exclusion on this type of application is only possible with risk estimation and additional measures.

2)   Tubing push-to-connect fittings, also known as push-in fittings or push-fit fittings, are considered as appropriately rated push-lock fittings if over-dimensioning and installation and operation instructions provided by the manufacturer are adhered to, notably the push-to-connect fitting matches the tube type being used.

3)   Hose push-lock fittings, e.g. featuring a barbed-end that is inserted into the hose, are considered as appropriately rated push-lock fittings only if high-pressure hose clamps are used.

— robust connection methods, i.e. compression fittings or appropriately rated push-lock fittings (see remarks 1 to 3);

— robust hoses, tubing and fittings;

— robust materials that are appropriate for the intended environment.

Clogging (blockage)

Yes, for applications in the power circuit and, in the case of control and measurement connectors, if the nominal diameter is ≥ 2 mm.

Table B.11 — Faults and fault exclusions — Pressure transmitters and pressure medium transducers

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Loss or change of air/oil‑tightness of pressure chambers

None.

Bursting of the pressure chambers as well as fracture of the attachment or cover screws

Yes, if dimensioning, choice of material, configuration and attachment are in accordance with good engineering practice.

Too high output pressure caused by too high inlet pressure

Yes, if an internal pressure relief valve in the inlet circuit is used.

Change of the ratio inlet pressure to output pressure

Yes, if the pressure ratio is fixed, e.g. by the design of the piston active areas and other internal measures.

NOTE Pressure transmitters and pressure medium transducers are devices to e.g. limit the output pressure or achieve a fixed ratio of inlet pressure to output pressure.

Table B.12 — Faults and fault exclusions — Compressed air treatment — Filters

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Blockage of the filter element

None.

Rupture or partial rupture of the filter element

Yes, if the filter element is sufficiently resistant to pressure.

Failure of the filter condition indicator or monitor

None.

Bursting of the filter housing or fracture of the cover or connecting elements

Yes, if dimensioning, choice of material, arrangement in the system and fixing are in accordance with good engineering practice.

Table B.13 — Faults and fault exclusions — Compressed-air treatment — Oilers

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Change in the set value (oil volume per unit time) without change to the setting device

None.

Spontaneous change in the setting device

Yes, if effective protection of the setting device is provided, adapted to the particular case.

Unintended unscrewing of the operating element of the setting device

Yes, if an effective positive locking device against unscrewing is provided.

Bursting of the housing or fracture of the cover, fixing or connecting elements.

Yes, if the dimensioning, choice of materials, arrangement in the system and fixing are in accordance with good engineering practice.

Table B.14 — Faults and fault exclusions — Compressed air treatment — Silencers

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Blockage (clogging) of the silencer

Yes, if the design and construction of the silencer element fulfils the remark.

Clogging of the silencer element and/or an increase in the exhaust air back-pressure above a certain critical value is unlikely if the silencer has a suitably large diameter and is designed to meet the operating conditions.

Table B.15 — Faults and fault exclusions — Accumulators and pressure vessels

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Fracture/bursting of the accumulator/pressure vessel or connectors or stripping of the threads of the fixing screws

Yes, if construction, choice of equipment, choice of materials and arrangement in the system are in accordance with good engineering practice.

Table B.16 — Faults and fault exclusions — Sensors

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Faulty sensor (see remark)

None.

Change of the detection or output characteristics

None.

 

NOTE Sensors in this table are devices for signal capture, processing and output, in particular for, e.g. pressure, flow, temperature.

Table B.17 — Faults and fault exclusions — Information processing — Logical elements

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Faulty logical element (e.g. AND element, OR element, logic-storage-element) due to, e.g. change in the switching time, failing to switch or incomplete switching

For corresponding fault assumptions and fault exclusions, see Tables B.4, B.5 and B.6 and the relevant related components.

Table B.18 — Faults and fault exclusions — Information processing — Time-delay devices

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Faulty time-delay device, e.g. pneumatic and pneumatic/mechanical time and counting elements

Yes, for time-delay devices without moving components, e.g. fixed resistance, if normal operating conditions apply and adequate treatment and filtration of the compressed air is provided.

Change of detection or output characteristics

Bursting of the housing or fracture of the cover or fixing elements

Yes, if construction, dimensioning and installation are in accordance with good engineering practice.

Table B.19 — Faults and fault exclusions — Information processing — Converters

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Faulty converter (see remark)

Yes, for converters without moving components, e.g. reflex nozzle, if normal operating conditions apply and adequate treatment and filtration of the compressed air is provided.

Change of the detection or output characteristics

Bursting of the housing or fracture of the cover or fixing elements

Yes, if construction, dimensioning and installation are in accordance with good engineering practice.

NOTE Converters in this table are devices to e.g. detect that a position is reached or switch between binary states (position reached/not reached, pressure on/off). They are also used to amplify pneumatic signals.

Annex C
(informative)

Validation tools for hydraulic systems

Annex C applies to hydraulic systems. It should also be considered when hydraulic systems are used in conjunction with other technologies. Where hydraulic components are electrically connected/controlled, the appropriate fault lists in Annex D should be considered.

NOTE Additional requirements can exist in national legislation.

Table C.1 and Table C.2 list basic and well-tried safety principles.

The use of components designed according to a product standard can be helpful for the confirmation of some basic or well-tried safety principles (see Table 2, Note 2). The fulfilment of principles can depend on multiple contributors (see 4.1, Table 2, implemented in column 3 of Table C.1 and Table C.2).

The status of “well-tried” is mainly application‑specific. Components can be described as “well-tried” if they are in accordance with ISO 13849‑1:2023, 6.1.11 and ISO 4413:2010, Clause 5 to Clause 7. A well-tried component for some applications could be inappropriate for other applications. The status of being well-tried does not mean that all faults can be excluded for a well-tried component

Table C.4 to Table C.13 list fault exclusions and their rationale.

Table C.1 — Basic safety principles

Basic safety principle

Remarks

Relevant for

(see Table 2)

Use of suitable materials and adequate manufacturing

Selection of material, manufacturing methods and treatment in relation to e.g. stress, durability, elasticity, friction, wear, corrosion, temperature, characteristics of hydraulic fluid.

M, D

Correct dimensioning and shaping

Consider, e.g. stress, strain, fatigue, surface roughness, tolerances, manufacturing.

M, D

Correct selection, combination, arrangements, assembly and installation of components or systems related to the application

Apply the installation and operation instructions provided by the manufacturer, e.g. catalogue sheets, installation instructions, specifications, and use of good engineering practice in similar components or systems.

M, D, U

Use of de-energization principle

This principle is not applicable when loss of energy creates a hazard, e.g. release of workpiece caused by loss of clamping or holding force.

The safe state is obtained by release of energy to all relevant devices. See primary action for stopping in ISO 12100:2010, 6.2.11.3.

Energy is supplied for starting the movement of a mechanism. See primary action for starting in ISO 12100:2010, 6.2.11.3.

Consider different modes, e.g. operation mode, maintenance mode.

Time-delay functions may be necessary to achieve a system safe state (see e.g. IEC 60204-1:2016 + AMD1:2021, 9.2.2).

M, D

Correct fastening

For fasteners (e.g. screw locking, fittings, gluing, clamp ring) apply the manufacturer’s installation and operation instructions.

Fastening in the correct orientation and fastening to the correct torque is considered. Overloading can be avoided by applying adequate torque loading technology.

M, D, U

Withstanding environmental conditions

(see ISO 13849-1:2023, Clause 10, and follow manufacturer's installation and operation instructions)

Design the equipment so that it can work within the environmental limits of the intended use and in any reasonably foreseeable adverse conditions, e.g. temperature, humidity, vibration, pollution, electromagnetic interference (EMI).

M, D, U

Prevention of the ingress of solid foreign objects and fluids

Apply appropriate protection against ingress of solid foreign objects and fluids.

M, D, U

Temperature range

External and internal temperature effects are considered throughout the whole system.

(See ISO 4413:2010)

M, D, U

Limitation of speed, acceleration and jerk (to avoid or limit mechanical stress)

An example is the speed limitation of a piston by a flow valve or a throttle.

M, D

Reduction of response time

Minimize delay in de-energizing of switching components.

Suitable range of switching time, e.g. length of pipework, pressure, evacuation relief capacity, spring fatigue, friction, lubrication, temperature, viscosity, inertia during acceleration and deceleration, frequencies, shock waves, combination of tolerances.

M, D

Protection against unexpected start-up

(see ISO 12100:2010, 6.2.11.4, ISO 14118:2017)

Consider unexpected start-up caused by stored energy and after power supply restoration for different modes, e.g. operation mode, maintenance mode.

M, D

Special equipment for release of stored energy can be necessary.

Special applications, e.g. to maintain energy for clamping devices or ensure a position, need to be considered separately.

M, D, U

Simplification

Avoid unnecessary components in the safety-related system.

M, D

Separation

Separation of safety-related functions from other functions.

M, D

Pressure limitation (e.g. to prevent wear)

Examples are pressure-relief valve, pressure-reducing/control valve.

M, D

Basic measures against contamination of the fluid

Consider filtration of solid particles and separation and water and gas from the fluid. Prevent contamination of fluid by external sources during installation and handling of components.

Consider an indicator for when the filter needs service.

M, D, U

Correct fluid handling

Air bubbles and restrictions in the hydraulic fluid are avoided because they can create cavitation which can cause additional hazards, e.g. unintended movements.

M, D, U

Abbreviations

M – Design and manufacturing of components

D – Design of subsystems

U – Use of the machine

Table C.2 — Well-tried safety principles

Well-tried safety principle

Remarks

Relevant for

(see Table 2)

Use of components with oriented failure mode

(see ISO 12100:2010, 6.2.12.3)

Use oriented failure mode components or systems wherever practicable. A safe state is directly or indirectly (e.g. through fault detection) obtained by the predominant failure mode.

M, D

Over-dimensioning

De-rate components when used in safety circuits.

Safety factors are as given in standards or by good engineering practice in safety-related applications.

M, D

Safe position

The moving part of the component is held in one of the possible positions by mechanical means. Force is needed to change the position, especially to leave a safe position.

M, D

Increased OFF force

A safe position or safe state is obtained by an increased OFF force in relation to the ON force.

One solution can be that the area ratio for moving a valve spool to the safe position (OFF position) is significantly larger than for moving the spool to the ON position (a safety factor).

M, D

Valve closed by load pressure

Examples are seat and cartridge valves.

Consider how to apply the load pressure to keep the valve closed even if, e.g. the spring closing the valve breaks.

M, D

Positive mechanical action

(See ISO 12100:2010, 6.2.5.)

The positive mechanical action is used for moving parts inside hydraulic components.

To achieve positive (or direct) mechanical action, mechanical components needed for the safety function are moved either by direct contact or via rigid elements.

M, D

Use of well-tried spring

See Table A.3.

M

Limited range of force and similar parameters to avoid or limit mechanical stress

 

This principle is not applicable when the continued integrity of components is essential to maintaining the necessary level of control.

Determination of the necessary limitation in relation to the experience and application.

This can be achieved by a well-tried pressure-relief valve which is, e.g. equipped with a well-tried spring, correctly dimensioned and selected.

M, D

Limited range of speed and similar parameters

Determination of the necessary limitation in relation to the experience and application.

Examples are fixed orifices and fixed throttles to reduce the speed by resistance to a defined fluidic flow.

M, D, U

Limited range of environmental parameters

See ISO 13849-1:2023, 10.7

Determination of the necessary limitations. Examples are temperature, humidity, pollution at the installation. Follow manufacturer's installation and operation instructions.

M, D, U

Limited range of reaction time, limited hysteresis

Determination of the necessary limitations.

For example, increased friction will increase the hysteresis. A combination of tolerances will also influence the hysteresis.

M, D

Appropriate range of working conditions

The limitation of working conditions, e.g. pressure range, flow rate and temperature range, is considered.

M, D, U

Enhanced measures against contamination of the fluid

Consideration of the need for a finer filtration and separation of solid particles and water in the fluid.

M, D, U

Sufficient positive overlapping in spool valves or piston valves

The positive overlapping ensures the stopping function and prevents dangerous movements.

M

Periodic evaluation of the fluid condition

Apply a high degree of filtration or separation of solid particles, water and contaminants in the fluid and an indication of the need for a filter service.

Evaluate the physical and chemical conditions of the fluid.

M, D, U

Abbreviations

M – Design and manufacturing of components

D – Design of subsystems

U – Use of the machine

Table C.3 — Well-tried components

Well-tried component

Conditions for “well-tried”

Standard or specification

Pressure relief valve (spring loaded)

All factors influencing the application are to be considered. See Table C.2.

Technical specifications for bursting disk/flat bursting disk and other special applications are given in ISO 4126-1:2013.

Directional Valve

(electrically or remotely actuated or piloted)

Only well-tried if

ISO 13849‑1:2023, 6.1.3.2.3, 6.1.11

a) the component fulfils the basic and well-tried safety principles with regard to the intended application, including use of the component according to the specification of the manufacturer;

b) proven to be widely used in the past with documented successful results in similar applications or made, verified and validated using principles which demonstrate its suitability and reliability for safety-related applications according to relevant product and application standards;

c) either no electronics on-board or on-board electronics, if available, does not participate in executing the safety function (see NOTE 3);

d) the behavior of the component under all conditions is well defined and can be completely determined; and

e) the following construction characteristics are fulfilled:

— simple, robust design;

— positive connection;

— sufficient protection against loosening with detachable connection;

— sufficiently robust in relation to the use (application) and the ambient conditions (e.g. pressure fluctuations, vibration);

— return force provided by a spring to a safe position;

— use of well-tried springs, see Table A.3; and

— sufficient tightness in locking direction.

Pressure switches

Only well-tried if

ISO 13849‑1:2023, 6.1.3.2.3, 6.1.11

For the electrical part, see IEC 60947­5­1:2024

a) the component fulfils the basic and well-tried safety principles with regard to the intended application, including use of the component according to the specification of the manufacturer;

b) proven to be widely used in the past with documented successful results in similar applications or made, verified and validated using principles which demonstrate its suitability and reliability for safety-related applications according to relevant product and application standards;

c) either no electronics on-board or on-board electronics, if available, does not participate in executing the safety function;

d) the behavior of the component under all conditions is well defined and can be completely determined; and

e) the following construction characteristics are fulfilled:

— simple, robust design;

— positive connection;

— sufficient protection against loosening with detachable connection;

— sufficiently robust in relation to the use (application) and the ambient conditions (e.g. pressure fluctuations, vibration); and

— sufficient dimensioning of the spring.

NOTE 1   The confirmation of basic and well-tried safety principles as well as proof of wide use in the past with documented successful results in similar applications can be done by the component manufacturer or by the designer of the subsystem.

NOTE 2   Examples of directional valves can be valve types with discrete (specific) positions: stop (shut-off) valve, gate valve, AND-valve, shuttle valve, non-return (check) valve, blocking valve, exhaust valve, pressure relief valve.

NOTE 3 Digital communication units for valve manifolds or pressure switches are complex and do not fulfil the conditions to be well-tried. If shutting-off the energy supply puts the valves into a safe state and if a fault exclusion for cross-circuit connections between the power supply and the control bus (see Annex D) can be made and if for the installed valves the conditions for “well-tried” are fulfilled, the manifold can be considered a well-tried component.

Table C.4 — Faults and fault exclusions — Directional control valves

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Change of switching times

Yes, in the case of positive mechanical action (see Table A.2) of the moving components as long as the actuating force is sufficiently large; or, in respect of the non-opening of a special type of cartridge seat valve, when used with at least one other valve, to control the main flow of the fluid [see remark 1)].

1) A special type of cartridge seat valve is obtained if

— the active area for initiating the safety-related switching movement is at least 90 % of the total area of the moving component (poppet);

— the effective control pressure on the active area can be increased up to the maximum working pressure (in accordance with ISO 5598:2020, 3.2.429) in line with the behavior of the seat valve in question;

— the effective control pressure on the area opposite the active area of the moving component is vented to a very low value compared with the maximum operating pressure, e.g. return pressure in case of pressure dump valves or supply pressure in case of suction/fill valves;

— the moving component (poppet) is provided with peripheral balancing grooves; and

— the pilot valve(s) to this seat valve is designed together in a manifold block (i.e. without hose assemblies and pipes for the connection of these valves).

Non-switching (sticking at an end or zero position) or incomplete switching (sticking at a random intermediate position)

Yes, in the case of positive mechanical action (see Table A.2) of the moving components if the actuating force is sufficiently large; or, in respect of the non-opening of a special type of cartridge seat valve, when used with at least one other valve, to control the main flow of the fluid [see remark 1)].

Spontaneous change of the initial switching position (without an input signal)

Yes, in the case of positive mechanical action (see Table A.2) of the moving components as long as the holding force is sufficiently large; or if well-tried springs are used (see Table A.3) and normal installation and operating conditions apply [see remark 2)]; or, in respect of the non-opening of a special type of cartridge seat valve, when used with at least one other valve, to control the main flow of the fluid [see remark 1)] and if normal installation and operating conditions apply [see remark 2)].

2) Normal installation and operating conditions apply when

— the conditions laid down by the manufacturer are taken into account;

— the weight of the moving component does not act in an unfavorable sense in terms of safety, e.g. horizontal installation;

— no special inertial forces affect the moving components, e.g. direction of motion considers the orientation of the moving machine parts; and

— no extreme vibration and shock stresses occur.

Leakage

Yes, in the case of seat valves, if normal installation and operating conditions apply (see remark) and an adequate filtration system is provided.

Normal installation and operating conditions apply when the conditions laid down by the manufacturer are considered.

Change in the leakage flow rate over a long period of use

None.

Bursting of the valve housing or breakage of the moving component(s) as well as breakage/fracture of the mounting or housing screws

Yes, if construction, dimensioning and installation are in accordance with good engineering practice.

For servo and proportional valves: hydraulic faults which cause uncontrolled behavior

Yes, in the case of servo and proportional directional valves, if these can be assessed in terms of safety as conventional directional control valves, owing to their design and construction.

NOTE If the control functions are realized by several single-function valves, then a fault analysis should be carried out for each valve. The same procedure should be carried out in the case of piloted valves.

Table C.5 — Faults and fault exclusions — Stop (shut–off) valves/non-return (check) valves/shuttle valves, etc.

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Change of switching times

None.

Non-opening, incomplete opening, non-closure or incomplete closure (sticking at an end position or at an arbitrary intermediate position)

Yes, if the guidance system for the moving component(s) is designed in a manner similar to that for a non-controlled ball seat valve without a damping system (see remark) and if well-tried springs are used (see Table A.3).

For a non-controlled ball seat valve without damping system, the guidance system is generally designed in such a manner that any sticking of the moving component is unlikely.

Spontaneous change of the initial switching position (without an input signal)

Yes, for normal installation and operating conditions (see remark) and if there is sufficient closing force based on the pressures and areas provided.

Normal installation and operating conditions are met when

 

— the conditions laid down by the manufacturer are followed;

— no special inertial forces affect the moving components, e.g. direction of motion considers the orientation of the moving machine parts; and

— no extreme vibration or shock stresses occur.

For shuttle valves: simultaneous closing of both input connections

Yes, if this simultaneous closing is unlikely, based on the construction and design of the moving component.

Leakage

Yes, if normal conditions of operation apply (see remark) and an adequate filtration system is provided.

Normal conditions of operation apply when the conditions laid down by the manufacturer are considered.

Change in the leakage flow rate over a long period of use

None.

Bursting of the valve housing or breakage of the moving component(s) as well as breakage/fracture of the mounting or housing screws

Yes, if construction, dimensioning and installation are in accordance with good engineering practice.

Table C.6 — Faults and fault exclusions — Flow valves

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Change in the flow rate without change in the setting device

Yes, in the case of flow valves without moving parts [see remark 1)], e.g. throttle valves, if normal operating conditions apply [see remark 2)] and an adequate filtration system is provided [see remark 3)].

1)   The setting device is not considered to be a moving part. Changes in flow rate due to changes in the pressure differences and viscosity are physically limited in this type of valve and are not covered by this assumed fault.

2)   Normal operating conditions are met when the conditions laid down by the manufacturer are followed.

3)   Where a non-return valve is integrated into the flow valve, then, in addition, the fault assumptions for non-return valves have to be considered.

Change in the flow rate in the case of non-adjustable, circular orifices and nozzles

Yes, if the diameter is ≥ 0,8 mm, normal operating conditions apply [see remark 2)] and an adequate filtration system is provided.

For proportional flow valves: change in the flow rate due to an unintended change in the set value

None.

Spontaneous change in the setting device

Yes, where there is an effective protection of the setting device adapted to the particular case, based upon technical safety specification(s).

Unintended loosening (unscrewing) of the operating element(s) of the setting device

Yes, if an effective positive locking device against loosening (unscrewing) is provided.

Bursting of the valve housing or breakage of the moving component(s) as well as the breakage/fracture of the mounting or housing screws

Yes, if construction, dimensioning and installation are in accordance with good engineering practice.

Table C.7 — Faults and fault exclusions — Pressure valves

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Non-opening or insufficient opening (spatially and temporarily) when exceeding the set pressure (sticking or sluggish movement of the moving component) [see remark 1)]

Yes, in respect of the non-opening of a special type of cartridge seat valve, when used with at least one other valve, to control the main flow of the fluid [see remark 1) of Table C.4]; or if the guidance system for the moving component(s) is similar to the case of a non-controlled ball seat valve without a damping device [see remark 2)] and if the installed springs are well-tried (see Table A.3).

1)   This fault applies only when the pressure valve(s) is (are) used for forced actions, e.g. clamping, and for the control of hazardous movement, e.g. suspension of loads. This fault does not apply to its normal function in hydraulic systems, e.g. pressure limitation, pressure decrease.

2)   For a non-controlled ball seat valve without a damping device, the guidance system is generally designed in such a manner that any sticking of the moving component is unlikely.

Non-closing or insufficient closing (spatially and temporarily) if the pressure drops below the set value (sticking or sluggish movement of the moving component) [see remark 1)]

Change of the pressure control behaviour without changing the setting device [see remark 1)]

Yes, in the case of directly actuated pressure-relief valves, if the installed spring(s) are well- tried (see Table A.3).

For proportional pressure valves: change in the pressure control behaviour due to unintended change in the set value [see remark 1)]

None.

Spontaneous change in the setting device

Yes, where there is an effective protection of the setting device adapted to the particular case in relation to technical safety specifications (e.g. lead seals).

Unintended unscrewing of the operating element of the setting device

Yes, if an effective positive locking device against unscrewing is provided.

Leakage

Yes, for seat valves if normal operating conditions apply (see remark) and if an adequate filtration system is provided.

Normal operating conditions apply when the conditions laid down by the manufacturer are considered.

Change of the leakage flow rate over a long period of use

None.

Bursting of the valve housing or breakage of the moving component(s) as well as breakage/fracture of the mounting or housing screws

Yes, if construction, dimensioning and installation are in accordance with good engineering practice.

Table C.8 — Faults and fault exclusions — Metal pipework

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Bursting and leakage

Yes, if the dimensioning, choice of materials and fixing are in accordance with good engineering practice.

Dimensioning, possible loads due to vibrations and pressure pulsations must be considered (e.g. due to gear pumps).

Failure at the connector (e.g. tearing off, leakage)

Yes, if welded fittings or welded flanges or flared fittings are used, and dimensioning, choice of materials, manufacture, configuration and fixing are in accordance with good engineering practice.

Clogging (blockage)

Yes, for pipework in the power circuit, and for control and measurement pipework if the nominal diameter is ≥ 3 mm.

 

Table C.9 — Faults and fault exclusions — Hose assemblies

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Bursting, tearing off at the fitting attachment and leakage

None.

Clogging (blockage)

Yes, for hose assemblies in the power circuit, and for control and measurement hose assemblies if the nominal diameter is ≥ 3 mm.

Table C.10 — Faults and fault exclusions — Connectors

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Bursting, breaking of screws or stripping of threads

Yes, if dimensioning, choice of material, manufacture, configuration and connection to the piping and/or to the fluid technology component are in accordance with good engineering practice.

Leakage (loss of the leak-tightness)

None (see remark).

Due to wear, ageing, deterioration of elasticity, etc., it is not possible to exclude faults over a long period. A sudden major failure of the leak-tightness is not assumed.

Clogging (blockage)

Yes, for applications in the power circuit, and for control and measurement connectors if the nominal diameter is ≥ 3 mm.

Table C.11 — Faults and fault exclusions — Filters

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Blockage of the filter element

None.

Rupture of the filter element

Yes, if the filter element is sufficiently resistant to pressure and an effective bypass valve or an effective monitoring of dirt is provided.

Failure of the bypass valve

Yes, if the guidance system of the bypass valve is designed similarly to that for a non-controlled ball seat valve without a damping device (see Table C.5) and if well-tried springs are used (see Table A.3).

Failure of the dirt indicator or dirt monitor

None.

Bursting of the filter housing or fracture of the cover or connecting elements

Yes, if dimensioning, choice of material, arrangement in the system and fixing are in accordance with good engineering practice.

Table C.12 —Faults and fault exclusions — Energy storage

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Fracture/bursting of the energy storage vessel or connectors or cover screws as well as stripping of the screw threads

Yes, if construction, choice of equipment, choice of materials and arrangement in the system are in accordance with good engineering practice.

Leakage at the separating element between the gas and the operating fluid

None.

Failure/breakage of the separating element between the gas and the operating fluid

Yes, in the case of cylinder/piston storage (see remark).

A sudden major leakage is not to be considered.

Failure of the filling valve on the gas side

Yes, if the filling valve is installed in accordance with good engineering practice and if adequate protection against external influences is provided.

Table C.13 — Faults and fault exclusions — Sensors

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Faulty sensor (see remark)

None.

Types of sensors include signal capture, processing and output, in particular for pressure, flow rate and temperature.

Change of the detection or output characteristics

None.

Annex D
(informative)

Validation tools for electrical systems

D.1 General

Annex D applies to electrical systems. It should also be considered when electric systems are used in conjunction with other technologies.

The environmental conditions of IEC 60204-1:2016 + AMD1:2021 apply to the validation process. If other environmental conditions are specified, they should also be considered.

Table D.1 and Table D.2 list basic and well-tried safety principles.

The fulfilment of principles can depend on multiple contributors (see 4.1, Table 2, implemented in column 3 of Table D.1 and Table D.2).

The use of components designed according to a product standard can be helpful for the confirmation of some basic or well-tried safety principles (see Table 2, Note 2).

NOTE 1 Examples of product standards are IEC 61131 (all parts) for programmable controller and their associated peripherals, IEC 61800 (all parts) for power drive systems and IEC 60947 (all parts) for low-voltage switchgear and control gear.

The components listed in Table D.3 are considered to be “well-tried” when they comply with the description given in ISO 13849‑1:2023, 6.1.11. The standards listed in Table D.3 should be used to demonstrate their suitability and reliability for a particular application. A well-tried component for some applications can be inappropriate for other applications. The status of being well-tried does not mean that all faults can be excluded for a well-tried component.

NOTE 2 Complex electronic components, such as programmable logic controllers (PLCs), microprocessors and application-specific integrated circuits, cannot be considered equivalent to the “well-tried” components.

Table D.4 to Table D.22 list fault exclusions.

For validation, both permanent faults and transient disturbances should be considered.

Table D.1 — Basic safety principles

Basic safety principle

Remarks

Relevant for

(see Table 2)

Use of suitable materials and adequate manufacturing

Selection of material, manufacturing methods and treatment in relation to e.g. stress, durability, elasticity, friction, wear, corrosion, temperature, conductivity, dielectric rigidity.

M, D

Correct dimensioning and shaping

Consider, e.g. stress, strain, fatigue, surface roughness, tolerances, manufacturing.

M, D

Correct selection, combination, arrangements, assembly and installation of components or systems related to the application

Apply the installation and operation instructions provided by the manufacturer, e.g. catalogue sheets, installation instructions, specifications, and use of good engineering practice in similar components or systems.

M, D, U

Use components compatible with the voltages and currents used.

M, D

Use of de-energization

This principle is not applicable when loss of energy creates a hazard, e.g. release of workpiece caused by loss of clamping or holding force.

The safe state is obtained by de-energizing all relevant devices, e.g. by use of normally closed (NC) contact for inputs (push-buttons and position switches) and normally open (NO) contact for relays (see also ISO 12100:2010, 6.2.11.3).

Time-delay functions may be necessary to achieve a system safe state (see e.g. IEC 60204-1:2016 + AMD1:2021, 9.2.2).

M, D

Correct fastening

For fastening of electrical conductors, e.g. DC busbars in frequency converters, apply the manufacturer's installation and operation instructions.

Fastening in the correct orientation and fastening to the correct torque is considered. Overloading can be avoided and adequate resistance to release can be achieved by applying adequate torque loading technology.

M, D, U

Withstanding environmental conditions

(see ISO 13849-1:2023, Clause 10, and follow manufacturer's installation and operation instructions)

Design the equipment so that it can work within the environmental limits of the intended use and in any reasonably foreseeable adverse conditions, e.g. temperature, humidity, vibration and electromagnetic interference (EMI).

M, D, U

Prevention of the ingress of solid foreign objects and fluids

Apply an appropriate degree of protection against ingress of solid foreign objects and fluids.

Consider IP rating (see IEC 60529:1989+AMD1:1999+AMD2:2013+Cor1:2019)

M, D, U

Limitation of speed, acceleration and jerk (to avoid or limit mechanical stress)

An example is the acceleration limitation of a motor by limitation of the motor current in a frequency converter.

M, D

Reduction of response time

Minimize delay in de-energizing of switching components.

Suitable range of switching time, e.g. response time of devices and components (e.g. solenoids, contactors, relays) and the effects of EMI measures to these elements (e.g. surge suppression diodes on contactors).

M, D

Protection against unexpected start-up

(see ISO 12100:2010, 6.2.11.4, ISO 14118:2017)

Consider unexpected start-up caused by stored energy and after power supply restoration for different modes, e.g. operation mode, maintenance mode.

(See IEC 60204-1:2016 + AMD1:2021).

M, D

Special equipment for release of stored energy can be necessary.

Special applications, e.g. to keep energy for clamping devices or ensure a position, need to be considered separately.

M, D, U

Simplification

Avoid unnecessary components in the safety-related system.

M, D

Separation

Separation of safety-related functions from other functions.

M, D

Current limitation (e.g. to prevent wear)

Example is a resistor (series resistor).

M, D

Correct protective bonding

One side of the control circuit, one terminal of the operating coil of each electromagnetic operated device, or one terminal of another electrical device is connected to the protective bonding circuit.

(See IEC 60204‑1:2016 + AMD1:2021, 9.4.3.1)

M, D, U

Insulation monitoring

Use of an insulation monitoring device which either indicates an earth fault or interrupts the circuit automatically after an earth fault.

(See IEC 60204‑1:2016 + AMD1:2021, 6.3.3)

M, D, U

Transient suppression

Use of a suppression device (RC, diode, varistor) parallel to the load, but not parallel to the contacts.

NOTE   A diode increases the switch-off time.

M, D

Temperature range

External and internal temperature effects are considered throughout the whole system.

M, D, U

Secure fixing of input devices

Secure input devices, e.g. interlocking switches, position switches, limit switches, proximity switches, so that position, alignment and switching tolerance is maintained under all expected conditions, e.g. vibration, normal wear, ingress of foreign bodies, temperature.

(See ISO 14119:2024, Clause 5)

M, D, U

Protection of the control circuit

Apply protection in accordance with IEC 60204‑1:2016 + AMD1:2021, 7.2 and 9.1.1.

M, D

Sequential switching for circuit of serial contacts of redundant signals

To avoid common mode failure by the welding of both contacts, switching on and off does not happen simultaneously, so that one contact always switches without load.

M, D

Abbreviations

M – Design and manufacturing of components

D – Design of subsystems

U – Use of the machine

Table D.2 — Well-tried safety principles

Well-tried safety principle

Remarks

Relevant for

(see Table 2)

Use of components with oriented failure mode

(see ISO 12100:2010, 6.2.12.3)

Use oriented failure mode components or systems wherever practicable. A safe state is directly or indirectly (e.g. through fault detection) obtained by the predominant failure mode.

M, D

Over-dimensioning

De-rate components when used in safety circuits, e.g. by the following means:

M, D

 

— the current passed through switched contacts should be less than half their rated current;

— the switching frequency of components should be less than half their rated value;

— the total number of expected switching operations should be no more than 10 % of the device’s electrical durability.

NOTE   De-rating can depend on the design rationale.

Safety factors are as given in standards or by good engineering practice in safety-related applications.

Separation distance

Use of sufficient distance between position terminals, components and wiring to avoid unintended connections.

M, D

Minimizing possibility of faults

Separate safety-related functions from the other functions.

M, D

Positive mechanical action

(see ISO 12100:2010, 6.2.5.)

Direct action is transmitted by the shape (and not the strength) with no elastic elements, e.g. spring between actuator and the contacts (see ISO 14119:2024, 5.1).

To achieve positive (or direct) mechanical action, mechanical components needed for the safety function are moved either by direct contact or via rigid elements.

M, D

Multiple parts

Reducing the effect of faults by providing multiple parts acting in parallel, e.g. where a failure of one of several resistors does not lead to a dangerous condition.

M, D

Use of well-tried spring

See Table A.3

M

Limited range of force and similar parameters to avoid or limit mechanical stress

This principle is not applicable when the continued integrity of components is essential to maintaining the necessary level of control.

Determination of the necessary limitation in relation to the experience and application.

M, D

Limited range of environmental parameters

See ISO 13849-1:2023, 10.7

Determination of the necessary limitations. Examples are temperature, humidity, pollution at the installation. Follow manufacturer's installation and operation instructions.

M, D, U

Limited range of reaction time, limited hysteresis

Determination of the necessary limitations.

For example, proper selection of protective devices.

M, D

Positively mechanically linked contacts

Use of positively mechanically linked contacts for, e.g. monitoring function in Category 2, 3, and 4 systems (IEC 61810-3:2015, IEC 60947‑4-1:2023, Annex F, IEC 60947‑5‑1:2024, Annex L).

M, D

Fault avoidance or detection in cables

To avoid or detect short circuits between two adjacent conductors,

M, D

 

— use cable with shielding connected to the protective bonding circuit on each separate conductor;

— in flat cables, use one earthed conductor between each signal conductor; or

— use cross-circuit monitoring, e.g. by test pulses.

Energy limitation

Use of a capacitor for supplying a finite amount of energy, e.g. in a timer application.

M, D

Limitation of electrical parameters

Limiting voltage, current, energy or frequency to restrict movement, e.g. torque limitation, hold-to-run with displacement/time limited, reduced speed, to avoid an unsafe state.

M, D

No undefined states

Avoid undefined states in the control system. Design and construct the control system so that, during normal operation and all expected operating conditions, its state, e.g. its output(s), can be predicted.

M, D

Failure mode orientation

Wherever possible, the device/circuit should fail to the safe state or condition.

M, D

Balance complexity and simplicity

Balance between complexity to reach better control and simplification to have better reliability.

M, D

Abbreviations

M – Design and manufacturing of components

D – Design of subsystems

U – Use of the machine

Table D.3 — Well-tried components

Well-tried component

Additional conditions for “well-tried”

Standard or specification

Switch with positive mode actuation (direct opening action), e.g.:

IEC 60947‑5‑1:2024, Annex K

 

— push-button;

— position switch;

— cam-operated selector switch, e.g. for mode of operation

Emergency stop device

ISO 13850:2015

IEC 60947‑5‑5:1997+AMD1:2005+AMD2:2016

Fuse

IEC 60269‑1:2024

Circuit-breaker

IEC 60947‑2:2024

Switches, disconnectors

IEC 60947‑3:2025

Differential circuit-breaker or RCD (residual current device)

IEC 60947‑2:2024

Main contactor

Only well-tried if

IEC 60947‑4‑1:2023

a) other influences are considered, e.g. vibration;

b) failure is avoided by appropriate methods, e.g. over-dimensioning (see Table D.2);

c) the short-circuit current to the load is limited by a protection device, e.g. thermal fuse; and

d) the circuits are protected by a protection device against overload.

Control and protective switching device or equipment (CPS)

IEC 60947‑6‑2:2020

Force Guided Relays (e.g. Auxiliary contactor, contactor relay)

Only well-tried if

IEC 61810-1:2015/AMD1:2019

IEC 61810-2:2017

IEC 61810-3:2015

IEC 60947‑5‑1:2024

IEC 60947‑4‑1:2023, Annex F

a) other influences are considered, e.g. vibration;

b) there is positive opening;

c) failure is avoided by appropriate methods, e.g. over-dimensioning (see Table D.2);

d) the current in the contacts is limited by a fuse or circuit-breaker to avoid the welding of the contacts; and

e) contacts are positively mechanically guided when used for monitoring.

Relay

Only well-tried if

IEC 61810-1:2015+AMD1:2019

IEC 61810-2:2017

IEC 61810-3:2015

a) other influences are considered, e.g. vibration;

b) positive opening action;

c) failure avoided by appropriate methods, e.g. over-dimensioning (see Table D.2); and

d) the current in the contacts is limited by fuse or circuit-breaker to avoid the welding of the contacts.

Transformer

IEC 61558 (all parts)

Cable

Protection of cabling external to enclosure against mechanical damage (including, e.g. vibration or bending) is considered.

IEC 60204‑1:2016 + AMD1:2021, Clause 12

Plug and socket

According to an electrical standard relevant for the intended application.

For interlocking, see also ISO 14119:2024.

Temperature switch

Only well-tried if

ISO 13849‑1:2023, 6.1.11

For the electrical part, see IEC 60730­1:2022

a) the component fulfils the basic and well-tried safety principles regarding the intended application (see NOTE), including use of the component according to the specification of the manufacturer;

b) proven to be widely used in the past with documented successful results in similar applications or made, verified and validated using principles which demonstrate its suitability and reliability for safety-related applications according to relevant product and application standards;

c) either no electronics on-board or on-board electronics, if available, does not participate in executing the safety function;

d) the behavior of the component under all conditions is well defined and can be completely determined; and

e) the following construction characteristics are fulfilled:

— simple, robust design;

— positive connection;

— sufficient protection against loosening with detachable connection; and

— sufficiently robust in relation to the use (application) and the ambient conditions (e.g. humidity, vibration).

NOTE The confirmation of basic and well-tried safety principles as well as proof of wide use in the past with documented successful results in similar applications can be done by the component manufacturer or by the designer of the subsystem.

D.2 Fault exclusion

D.2.1 General

A fault exclusion is valid only if the parts operate within their specified ratings.

D.2.2 “Tin whiskers”

If lead-free processes and products are applied, electrical short circuits due to the growth of “tin whiskers” can occur. This possibility should be evaluated and considered when applying the fault exclusion “short circuit …” of any component. For example, if the risk of tin whisker growth is considered high, the fault exclusion "short circuit of a resistor" is useless, since a short between the contacts of this component has to be considered.

NOTE 1 Tin whisker growth is a phenomenon related mainly to pure bright tin finishes. The needle-like protrusions can grow to several hundred micrometers in length and can cause electrical short circuits. The prevailing theory is that the whiskers are caused by compressive stress build-up in tin plating.

NOTE 2 References [47] and [48] can be helpful for evaluation of the phenomenon.

NOTE 3 Whiskers on printed circuit boards have not so far been reported. Tracks usually consist of copper without tin coating. Pads can be coated with tin alloy, but the production process seems not to stimulate the susceptibility to whisker growing.

D.2.3 Short circuits on PCB-mounted parts

Short circuits for parts which are mounted on a printed circuit board (PCB) can only be excluded if the fault exclusion “short circuit between two adjacent tracks/pads”, described in Table D.5, is made.

D.2.4 Fault exclusions and integrated circuits

As it is not possible to exclude faults that can cause the malfunction of an integrated circuit (see Table D.20 and Table D.21), a single fault can lead to loss of a safety function (including its check/test) implemented in a single integrated circuit. Consequently, it is highly unlikely that either the multi-channel functionality necessary for the fault tolerance or detection requirements of category 2, 3 or 4, or both, can be achieved using a single integrated circuit, unless it satisfies the special architecture requirements of IEC 61508-2:2010, Annex E.

Table D.4 — Faults and fault exclusions — Conductors/cables

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Short circuit between any two conductors

Short circuits between conductors which are

Provided both the conductors and enclosure meet the appropriate requirements (see IEC 60204-1:2016 + AMD1:2021).

 

— permanently connected (fixed) and protected against external damage, e.g. by cable ducting, armoring;

— separate multicore cables;

— within an electrical enclosure (see remark); or

— individually shielded with earth connection.

Short circuit of any conductor to an exposed conductive part or to earth or to the protective bonding conductor

Short circuits between conductor and any exposed conductive part within an electrical enclosure (see remark).

Open circuit of any conductor

None.

Table D.5 — Faults and fault exclusions — Printed circuit boards/assemblies

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Short circuit between two adjacent tracks/pads

Short circuits between adjacent conductors in accordance with remarks.

As base material, EP GC according to IEC 60893-1:2004 is used as a minimum.

The clearances and creepage distances are dimensioned to at least IEC 60664‑1:2025, for pollution degree 2/overvoltage category III. If both tracks are powered by a SELV/PELV power supply, pollution degree 2/overvoltage category II applies, with a minimum clearance of 0,1 mm.

The assembled board is mounted in an enclosure giving protection against conductive contamination, e.g. an enclosure with a protection of at least IP54, and the printed side(s) is (are) coated with an ageing-resistant varnish or protective layer covering all conductor paths.

NOTE 1   Experience has shown that solder masks are satisfactory as a protective layer.

NOTE 2   A further protective layer covering according to IEC 60664‑3:2016 can reduce the creepage distances and clearances dimensions.

Open circuit of any track

None.

Table D.6 — Faults and fault exclusions — Terminal block

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Short circuit between adjacent terminals

Short circuit between adjacent terminals in accordance with remarks 1) or 2).

1)   The terminals and connections used are in accordance with IEC 60947‑7-1:2025 or IEC 60947‑7-2:2009 and the requirements of IEC 60204‑1:2016 + AMD1:2021, 13.1.1, are satisfied.

2)   The design in itself ensures that a short circuit is avoided, e.g. by shaping shrink-down plastic tubing over connection point.

Open circuit of individual terminals

None.

Table D.7 — Faults and fault exclusions — Multi–pin connector

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Short circuit between any two adjacent pins

Short circuit between adjacent pins in accordance with remark.

If the connector is mounted on a PCB, the fault exclusion considerations of Table D.5 apply.

By using ferrules or other suitable means for multi-stranded wires. Creepage distances and clearances and all gaps should be dimensioned to at least IEC 60664‑1:2025 with overvoltage category III.

Interchanged or incorrectly inserted connector when not prevented by mechanical means

None.

Short circuit of any conductor (see remark) to earth or a conductive part or to the protective conductor

None.

The core of the cable is considered a part of the multi‑pin connector.

Open circuit of individual connector pins

None.

Table D.8 — Faults and fault exclusions — Switches — Electromechanical position switches, manually operated switches (e.g. push-button, reset actuator, DIP switch, magnetically operated contacts, reed switch, pressure switch, temperature switch)

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Contact will not close

None.

Contact will not open

Contacts in accordance with IEC 60947‑5-1:2024, Annex K, are expected to open.

Short circuit between adjacent contacts insulated from each other

Short circuit can be excluded for switches in accordance with IEC 60947‑5-1:2024 (see remark).

Conductive parts which become loose should not be able to bridge the insulation between contacts.

Simultaneous short circuit between three terminals of change-over contacts

Simultaneous short circuits can be excluded for switches in accordance with IEC 60947‑5-1:2024 (see remark).

NOTE 1   For PL e, a fault exclusion for mechanical (e.g. the mechanical link between an actuator and a contact element) and electrical aspects is not allowed. In this case redundancy is necessary. For emergency stop devices in accordance with IEC 60947‑5-5:1997+AMD1:2005+AMD2:2016, a fault exclusion for mechanical aspects is allowed if a maximum number of operations is considered.

NOTE 2   The fault lists for the mechanical aspects are considered in Annex A.

Table D.9 — Faults and fault exclusions — Switches — Electromechanical devices (e.g. relays, contactors and valve switches)

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

All contacts remain in the energized position when the coil is de-energized (e.g. due to mechanical fault)

None.

All contacts remain in the de-energized position when power is applied (e.g. due to mechanical fault, open circuit of coil)

None.

Contact will not open

None.

Contact will not close

None.

Simultaneous short circuit between the three terminals of a change-over contact

Simultaneous short circuit can be excluded if remarks are considered.

The creepage and clearance distances are dimensioned to at least IEC 60664‑1:2025 with at least pollution degree 2/overvoltage category III.

Conductive parts which become loose cannot bridge the insulation between contacts and the coil.

Short circuit between two pairs of contacts and/or between contacts and coil terminal

Short circuit can be excluded if remarks are considered.

Simultaneous closing of normally open and normally closed contacts

Simultaneous closing of contacts can be excluded if remark is considered.

Positively driven (or mechanically linked) contacts are used (see IEC 60947‑5‑1:2024, Annex L).

Table D.10 — Faults and fault exclusions — Switches — Proximity switches

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Permanently low resistance at output

None (see remark).

See IEC 60947‑5‑3:2013.

Permanently high resistance at output

None (see remark).

Fault prevention measures should be described.

Interruption in power supply

None.

No operation of switch due to mechanical failure

No operation due to mechanical failure when remark is considered.

All parts of the switch should be sufficiently well fixed. For mechanical aspects, see Annex A.

Short circuit between the three connections of a change-over switch

None.

Table D.11 — Faults and fault exclusions — Switches — Solenoid valves

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Does not energize

None.

Does not de-energize

None.

NOTE   The fault lists for the mechanical aspects of pneumatic and hydraulic valves are considered in Annexes B and C respectively.

Table D.12 — Faults and fault exclusions — Discrete electrical components — Transformers

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Open circuit of individual winding

None.

Short circuit between different windings

Short circuit between different windings can be excluded if remarks 1) and 2) are considered.

1)   The requirements of the relevant parts of IEC 61558 (all parts) should be met.

2)   Between different windings, doubled or reinforced insulation or a protective screen applies. Testing according to e.g. IEC 61558‑1:2017, Clause 18, applies. Appropriate test voltages are given in IEC 61558‑1:2017, Table 8 a) or other appropriate product standards.

Short circuits in coils and windings need to be avoided by taking appropriate steps; e.g.

Short circuit in one winding

A short circuit in one winding can be excluded if remark 1) is considered.

Change in effective turns ratio

Change in effective turns ratio can be excluded if remark 1) is considered. See also remark 3).

 

 

 

— impregnating the coils so as to fill all the cavities between individual coils and the body of the coil and the core;

— using winding conductors well within their insulation and high-temperature ratings.

 

 

3)   In the event of a secondary short circuit, heating above a specified operating temperature should not occur.

Table D.13 — Faults and fault exclusions — Discrete electrical components — Inductances

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Open circuit

None.

Short circuit

Short circuit can be excluded if remark is considered.

Coil is single-layered, enamelled or potted, with axial wire connections and axial-mounted.

Random change of value 0,5 LN < L < LN + tolerance, where LN is the nominal value of the inductors

None.

Depending upon the type of construction, other ranges can be considered.

Table D.14 — Faults and fault exclusions — Discrete electrical components — Resistors

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Open circuit

None.

Short circuit

Short circuit can be excluded if remark 1) or 2) is considered.

1)   The resistor is of the film type, or wire-wound single-layer type with protection to prevent unwinding of wire in the event of breakage, with axial wire connections, axial-mounted and varnished.

2)   Resistors in surface-mount technology must be of the thin film metal type in package types MELF, mini MELF or µMELF.

3)   For example, if the risk of tin-whisker growth is considered high, the fault exclusion “short circuit of a resistor” is useless, since a short between the contacts of this component has to be considered.

Random change of value 0,5 RN < R < 2 RN, where RN is the nominal value of resistance

None.

Depending upon the type of construction, other ranges can be considered.

Table D.15 — Faults and fault exclusions — Discrete electrical components — Resistor networks

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Open circuit

None.

Short circuit between any two connections

None.

Short circuit between any connections

None.

Random change of value 0,5 RN < R < 2 RN, where RN is the nominal value of resistance

None.

Depending upon the type of construction, other ranges can be considered.

Table D.16 — Faults and fault exclusions — Discrete electrical components — Potentiometers

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Open circuit of individual connection

None.

Short circuit between all connections

None.

Short circuit between any two connections

None.

Random change of value 0,5 Rp < R < 2 Rp, where Rp is the nominal value of resistance

None.

Depending upon the type of construction, other ranges can be considered.

Table D.17 — Faults and fault exclusions — Discrete electrical components — Capacitors

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Open circuit

None.

Short circuit

None.

Random change of value 0,5 CN < C < CN + tolerance, where CN is the nominal value of capacitance

None.

Depending upon the type of construction, other ranges can be considered.

Changing value tan δ

None.

Table D.18 — Faults and fault exclusions — Electronic components — Discrete semiconductors (e.g. diodes, Zener diodes, transistors, triacs, thyristors, voltage regulators, quartz crystal, phototransistors, light-emitting diodes [LEDs])

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Open circuit of any connection

None.

Short circuit between any two connections

None.

Short circuit between all connections

None.

Change in characteristics

None.

Table D.19 — Faults and fault exclusions — Electronic components — Couplers for galvanic isolation (e.g. optocouplers, capacitive couplers)

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Open circuit of individual connection

None.

Short circuit between any two input connections

None.

Short circuit between any two output connections

None.

Short circuit between any two connections of input and output

Short circuit between input and output can be excluded if the remarks are considered.

The coupler is built in accordance with overvoltage category III according to IEC 60664‑1:2025. If a SELV/PELV power supply is used, pollution degree 2/overvoltage category II applies.

NOTE   See Table D.5.

Measures are taken to ensure that an internal failure of the coupler for galvanic isolation cannot result in excessive temperature of its insulating material.

Table D.20 — Faults and fault exclusions — Electronic components — Non–programmable and non-complex integrated circuits

Fault considered

Fault exclusions

Remarks

Open circuit of each individual connection

None.

Short circuit between any two connections

None.

Stuck-at-fault (i.e. short circuit to 1 and 0 with isolated input or disconnected output). Static “0” and “1” signal at all inputs and outputs, either individually or simultaneously

None.

Parasitic oscillation of outputs

None.

Changing values (e.g. input/output voltage of analogue devices or change of information due to soft error if shown to be relevant)

None.

See Annex D.3.

NOTE   In this document, ICs with either less than 1 000 gates or less than 24 pins, or both; operational amplifiers; shift registers and hybrid modules are considered non-complex. This definition is arbitrary.

Table D.21 — Faults and fault exclusions — Electronic components — Programmable or complex integrated circuits

Fault considered

Fault exclusions

Remarks

Faults in all or part of the function including software faults

None.

Open circuit of each individual connection

None.

Short circuit between any two connections

None.

Stuck-at-fault (i.e. short circuit to 1 and 0 with isolated input or disconnected output). Static “0” and “1” signal at all inputs and outputs, either individually or simultaneously

None.

Parasitic oscillation of outputs

None.

Changing value, e.g.

None.

See Annex D.3

 

— input/output voltage of analogue devices

— change of information due to soft error if shown to be relevant, e.g. for RAM, FPGA

Undetected faults in the hardware which go unnoticed because of the complexity of the integrated circuit

None.

NOTE 1 The analysis should identify additional faults, which should be considered if they influence the operation of the safety function.

NOTE 2 In this document, an IC is considered complex if it consists of either more than 1 000 gates or more than 24 pins, or both. This definition is arbitrary.

Table D.22 — Faults and fault exclusions – Transmission errors in digital data communication

Fault considered

Fault exclusion

Remarks

Communication errors (corruption, unintended repetition, incorrect sequence, loss, unacceptable delay, insertion, masquerade, addressing)

None

Measures to control the effects of errors and other effects arising from any data communication, including transmission errors (such as corruption, unintended repetition, incorrect sequence, loss, unacceptable delay, insertion, masquerade, addressing) should be applied.

NOTE  1   Further information can be found in IEC 61784-3:2021+AMD1:2024, 5.3, Table 1 and IEC 61508-2:2010, 7.4.11.2.

NOTE 2   The term ‘masquerade’ means that the true contents of a message are not correctly identified. For example, a message from a non-safety component is incorrectly identified as a message from a safety component.

D.3 Soft errors

D.3.1 General

Soft errors are relevant for hardware containing semiconductors with volatile memories and sequential logic.

Components can be used without consideration of soft error rates if mitigation measures (see D.3.4.3), implemented in hardware, SRESW or SRASW, are integrated. The contribution of soft errors to the PFH is typically considered at subsystem level in the following three steps: analysis, avoidance, and control. Soft errors are normally considered up to the subsystem level. In the design phase of integration of subsystems to SRP/CS, normally there is no need to consider soft errors.

For further information on soft errors see also IEC 61508-2-1 Ed 1 (under development) as well as IEC 61508-4:2010.

D.3.2 Introduction to soft errors

Soft errors

— are non-permanent unintended hardware states, e.g. reverse or flip the data state of a semiconductor memory cell, latch, or flip flop, which can persist as a latent fault;

— are types of errors where a signal or data value is corrupted, but there is no permanent damage to the hardware;

— are mainly caused by charge disturbance due to radiation events (alpha particles from package decay and cosmic rays creating energetic neutrons);

— are random hardware faults that can be quantified with a probabilistic method supported by measured data;

— mainly affect volatile memories and sequential logic;

— can be classified as single event upset (SEU) or multiple bit upset (MBU).

D.3.3 Relevance of soft errors for functional safety

This document states in Annex D.1 (General) that for validation, both permanent faults and transient disturbances should be considered.

Especially digital circuits, e. g. RAM, FPGA, microcontrollers, show a high susceptibility to soft errors. Flash memories are non-volatile and therefore they usually show lower susceptibility.

Soft error rates can dominate compared with rates of permanent random hardware faults for certain technologies. This depends on the amount and density of memory cells in RAM memories.

Diagnostic measures effective for hard errors will possibly not be effective for soft errors. The effect of soft errors can be mastered by adequate safety measures at runtime. RAM tests, such as walk-path, galpat, etc. are not effective, whereas monitoring techniques such as parity and error correcting code (ECC) with recurring read of the memory cells are.

Soft errors are expected to remain relevant also in the future. This is due to device scaling, continuous decreasing of the technology node size and of the integrated circuit supply voltage.

For further information see IEC 61508-7:2010, A.5.

D.3.4 Avoidance and control of soft errors during subsystem design

D.3.4.1 Analysis

Each integrated circuit, containing e. g. flip flops, latches, volatile memory elements or analogue devices should be investigated for potential susceptibility to soft errors.

Diagnostic measures implemented in integrated circuits such as ECC can reduce the probability that a soft error will result in a dangerous failure in the safety function.

Offline CPU self-tests or RAM tests are not effective for soft errors. The effect of soft errors can only be mastered by safety measures at runtime. Scrubbing of memories is a means to reduce build-up of multibit errors.

D.3.4.2 Avoidance and reduction of soft errors

The probability of soft errors can be reduced by avoidance of electronic components with high soft error susceptibility or substitution of them by components with low susceptibility. Suitable components with low soft error rates should be selected according to their data sheets or manufacturer’s information.

NOTE Depending on the application it is sometimes not possible to avoid soft errors completely if complex electronic components are used (containing memory elements).

Depending on the application design measures at subsystem or SRP/CS level, e. g. shielding against cosmic rays can reduce the probability of soft errors. Shielding is not effective against radioactive contaminants in the chip-housing or in the semiconductor material itself.

D.3.4.3 Control of soft errors

To improve the control of soft errors additional measures, like e.g. radiation hardened design or software measures (e.g. on-chip ECC or redundant data storage), can be applied.

For single channel architectures such as Categories B and 2, software mitigation measures e. g. based on informational redundancy (for example by adding extra information to the data by means of error correcting codes), or temporal redundancy (e.g. by executing the same program two times in sequence; SEU are detected by comparison) are effective against dangerous failures due to soft errors.

NOTE For information on soft errors mitigation solutions see [50].

Redundant functional channels with fault detection by comparison are very effective against dangerous failures due to soft errors. Since soft errors have local causes even homogeneous redundancy shows high efficiency. This is different from common cause failures (CCF) where homogeneous redundancy in some cases is less effective.

Soft errors are more critical to single channel architectures such as category B and 1, but category B is limited to PL b. Furthermore, in category 1 complex components as mentioned in D.3.2 are not considered as equivalent to well-tried.

Soft errors can significantly affect single channel architectures such as category 2 with low diagnostic coverage. In this case the PL is limited to c or in rare cases d.

Soft errors are less critical to single channel architectures such as category 2 with at least medium diagnostic coverage or architectures with redundant channels as category 3 and 4.

D.3.4.4 Determination of soft error rates to estimate PFH

For the determination of PFH, relevant soft error rates can be considered in the same way as hardware failure rates.

Soft errors are not expected to affect both channels in a category 2, 3 or 4 system in the same way. For this reason, the soft error rate typically does not have to be considered in the CCF part of the PFH calculation.

Generally, the portion of the soft error rate induced by cosmic radiation depends on the altitude above sea level. For cases of applications intended to be operated at higher altitudes, see [49] for further information.

D.3.4.5 Priority for the determination of soft error rates

The primary source for soft error rates is the data provided by the semiconductor manufacturer, e. g. data sheets and white papers.

NOTE 1 It is preferable that the semiconductor manufacturer makes the base failure rate caused by alpha particles and neutrons available to the subsystem manufacturer for example in the safety manual[49]. is considered as the main reference for the testing and calculation of the soft error rate by semiconductor manufacturers. On the semiconductor level logical and electrical masking is possible. In addition, process measures, layout measures or design techniques can prevent or reduce soft errors.

If the semiconductor manufacturer does not provide soft error rates, as an alternative, estimated values can be used. The documents maintained by the International Roadmap for Devices and Systems (IRDS) such as the International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS) provide projected values for the soft error rate for each chip generation.

As a last option, SN 29500-2:2010 (soft error rate 1 000 FIT/Mbit for SRAM devices) or other generic sources can be used as a rough estimation.

NOTE 2   SN 29500-1:2016, Clause 3 specifies the failure rates in FIT (failure in time), i.e., the number of failures in 109 component hours. Therefore λ = 1 FIT is equal to λ = 10-9 h-1 (λ = 1/MTTF, therefore λ = 1 FIT is equivalent to MTTF = 114 155 a).

D.3.4.6 Non-accessible hardware

Non-accessible hardware in the context of soft errors means, e.g. components without safety rating by the manufacturer, are used as “black box” components in the design of subsystems. The contribution of soft error rates to the PFH value of a subsystem typically cannot be determined because the necessary detailed internal hardware information (e.g. type, number, failure rate and size of programmable logic involved and the fraction of memory bits that are safety relevant for the proper execution of the safety function) is not available to the integrator or designer of the subsystem. These components can be used without consideration of soft error rates if software mitigation measures (see D.3.4.3), implemented in hardware, SRESW or SRASW, are integrated in the non-accessible hardware. If no information is available regarding the implementation of software mitigation measures or if it is not possible to implement software mitigation measures in hardware, SRESW or SRASW, as a last alternative, these components can be used with consideration of soft error rates estimated as a 10 % reduction of the calculated MTTFD for random hardware failures.

NOTE 1 The 10 % estimate is based on the assumption that typically only a small amount of the volatile memory is safety-relevant and can lead to a dangerous failure. Additionally, most modern memory technologies internally use some soft error correcting mechanism.

See also 7.3.2 of ISO 13849-1:2023 if the non-accessible hardware incorporates non-accessible embedded software.

NOTE 2 Soft errors typically do not contribute to the PFH portion due to CCF, which is typically the main
PFH contribution in categories 3 and 4 (see D.3.4.4).

NOTE 3 For components without a safety rating from the manufacturer, the reliability value available from the component manufacturer is usually only a rough estimate.

D.3.5 Example demonstrating the contribution of soft errors to estimate PFH

The example in Figure D.1 of a category 2 SRP/CS is intended to demonstrate the contribution of soft errors to the estimation of PFH according to the procedure laid down in D.3.4. The description of any details not relevant for soft errors is omitted.

Key

interconnecting means

monitoring/testing

Figure D.1 — Safety-related block diagram for a category 2 SRP/CS

An analysis of the relevance of soft errors in this example shows that only the microcontroller (TE) is susceptible to soft errors.

For this example, a 64-bit microcontroller with ARM architecture was chosen, which is used in many control designs. Referring to the manufacturer's data sheet, it has 2 GByte of working memory (DRAM), 4 GByte of internal physical solid-state memory (eMMC) as well as 128 kByte of internal remanent solid-state memory (NVRAM).

Only the volatile memory (DRAM) contributes to the soft error rate since the solid-state memories (eMMC and NVRAM) are not affected by soft errors.

Errors in the data transmission of the PtP sensor (a sensor communicating by point-to-point-protocol) to the microcontroller due to soft errors are successfully controlled by error detecting measures in the data transmission protocol using cyclic redundancy checks (CRC) and other typical measures. The interconnection between the PtP sensor and the relay is based on a 24 V DC signal which is not susceptible to soft errors. The same applies for the interconnections to the valves.

Avoidance and reduction of soft errors has been considered in this example by choosing a microcontroller suitable for this application which shows a low susceptibility to soft errors (low soft error rate). By separation of the safety-related embedded software (SRESW) from the non-safety-related software it can be estimated by analysis of the machine code that only about 1 MByte of the total 2 GByte DRAM contains SRESW.

The manufacturer of the microcontroller specifies a soft error rate of 100 FIT/MByte for its included volatile memory in the data sheet. Using a worst-case estimation of 50 % dangerous failures, this results in a dangerous failure rate due to soft errors λD = 50 FIT (or MTTFD = 2 283 a, see D.3.4.5, NOTE 2). Because soft errors events and permanent random hardware faults are statistically independent, both related failure rates have to be added to get the overall dangerous failure rate of TE.

This additional soft error contribution is not considered for the PFH portion due to CCF.

NOTE 1 The simplified procedure for estimating the PL for subsystems (see ISO 13849-1:2023, 6.1.8) is not capable of handling a separate dangerous failure rate for the PFH portion due to CCF. The alternative method which will be outlined in ISO/TR 13849-3 (currently being developed) allows for separate handling.

NOTE 2 The supplement of 2 283 years, due to soft errors, to the MTTFD of the block TE is very low compared to the contribution of permanent random hardware failures.

Annex ZAA
(informative)

Relationship between this European Standard and the essential requirements of Directive 2006/42/EC aimed to be covered

This European Standard has been prepared under a Commission’s standardization request “M/396 Mandate to CEN and CENELEC for Standardisation in the field of machinery" to provide one voluntary means of conforming to essential requirements of Directive 2006/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on machinery, and amending Directive 95/16/EC (recast).

Once this standard is cited in the Official Journal of the European Union under that Directive, compliance with the normative clauses of this standard given in Table ZAA.1 confers, within the limits of the scope of this standard, a presumption of conformity with the corresponding essential requirements of that Directive, and associated EFTA regulations.

Table ZAA.1 — Correspondence between this European Standard and Annex I of Directive 2006/42/EC

The relevant Essential Requirements of Directive 2006/42/EC

Clause(s)/sub-clause(s) of this EN

Remarks/Notes

1.2.1.   Safety and reliability of control systems

4

Table ZAA.2 — Applicable Standards to confer presumption of conformity as described in this Annex ZAA

Reference in Clause 2

International Standard Edition

Title

Corresponding European Standard Edition

ISO 12100:2010

ISO 12100:2010

Safety of machinery — General

principles for design — Risk

assessment and risk reduction

 EN ISO 12100:2010

ISO 13849-1:2023

ISO 13849-1:2023

Safety of machinery —

Safety-related parts of control systems

Part 1: General principles for design

EN ISO 13849-1:2023

The documents listed in the Column 1 of Table ZAA.2, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document, i.e. are indispensable for its application. The achievement of the presumption of conformity is subject to the application of the edition of Standards as listed in Column 4 or, if no European Standard Edition exists, the International Standard Edition given in Column 2 of Table ZAA.2.

WARNING 1 — Presumption of conformity stays valid only as long as a reference to this European Standard is maintained in the list published in the Official Journal of the European Union. Users of this standard should consult frequently the latest list published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

WARNING 2 — Other Union legislation may be applicable to the product(s) falling within the scope of this standard.

Annex ZAB
(informative)

Relationship between this European Standard and the essential requirements of Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 aimed to be covered

This European Standard has been prepared under a Commission’s standardization request C(2025)121 final Commission Implementing Decision of 20 January 2025 to the European Committee for Standardization and to the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization as regards machinery in support of Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 of the European Parliament and of the Council (M/605) to provide one voluntary means of conforming to essential requirements of Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2023 on machinery (OJ L 165, 29.6.2023).

Once this standard is cited in the Official Journal of the European Union under that Regulation, compliance with the normative clauses of this standard given in Table ZAB.1 confers, within the limits of the scope of this standard, a presumption of conformity with the corresponding essential requirements of that Regulation, and associated EFTA regulations.

Table ZAB.1 — Correspondence between this European Standard and Annex III of Regulation (EU) 2023/1230

The relevant Essential Requirements of Regulation (EU) 2023/1230

Clause(s)/sub-clause(s) of this EN

Remarks/Notes

1.2.1.   Safety and reliability of control systems

4

Exclusions:

2.   Paragraph: (a) second part: “... and intended and unintended external influences, including reasonably foreseeable malicious attempts from third parties leading to a hazardous situation”, (d), (f)

3.   Paragraph: (a), (b), (c)

4.   Paragraph: (c)

Table ZAB.2 — Applicable Standards to confer presumption of conformity as described in this Annex ZAB

Reference in Clause 2

International Standard Edition

Title

Corresponding European Standard Edition

ISO 12100:2010

ISO 12100:2010

Safety of machinery — General

principles for design — Risk

assessment and risk reduction

EN ISO 12100:2010

ISO 13849-1:2023

ISO 13849-1:2023

Safety of machinery —

Safety-related parts of control systems

Part 1: General principles for design

EN ISO 13849-1:2023

The documents listed in the Column 1 of Table ZAB.2, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document, i.e. are indispensable for its application. The achievement of the presumption of conformity is subject to the application of the edition of Standards as listed in Column 4 or, if no European Standard Edition exists, the International Standard Edition given in Column 2 of Table ZAB.2.

WARNING 1 — Presumption of conformity stays valid only as long as a reference to this European Standard is maintained in the list published in the Official Journal of the European Union. Users of this standard should consult frequently the latest list published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

WARNING 2 — Other Union legislation may be applicable to the product(s) falling within the scope of this standard.

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